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Abstract 
 
Several recent criminal cases against high-ranking Kazakhstani Ministry of Internal Affairs 
officials who had been charged with organizing drug dealing groups of 30 to 50 members 
within their departments have exposed sophisticated criminal operations involving significant 
flows of cash, narcotics, and corrupt influence. Some of these officers have been convicted 
and sent to prison right away, others have been initially released only to find themselves 
convicted and sentenced to imprisonment a few years later, yet others escaped the 
punishment. How can we explain this mixed, successful yet protracted criminal prosecution 
of corrupt police officers who have been protecting drug dealing groups in what many view 
as corrupt political system? 
Drawing on the evidence gained from the analysis of mass media reports on drug-
related topics, Kazakhstani criminal legislation and court records, from interviews with the 
law-enforcement officials dealing with drug-trafficking (detectives, investigators, judges, 
lawyers, criminals, etc.), and from participant observation of criminal trials of police officers 
in Kostanay, I argue that the structure of internal and external incentives accounts for both 
police involvement in organized crime and the mixed success in combatting it. Strong 
internal incentives arise from Soviet legacies such as formal statistical evaluation of police 
officers’ performance and from informal subculture within these law-enforcement agencies. 
Meanwhile, weaker external incentives arise from imperfect legislation, pressure from 
politicians, an inter-agency competition and highly developed practices of corruption, all of 
which weakens law enforcement’s the ability to prosecute both organized crime and corrupt 
officials. I conclude that modern Central Asian states are too weak to prosecute a relatively 
new type of transnational crime such a drug trafficking. More broadly, this helps advance our 
theoretical understanding of how formal and informal political institutions interact in 
different political orders.  
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Chapter 1 Making Sense of Police Corruption in Kazakhstan 
 
Research puzzle and questions 
On January 2014, a criminal sentence had been pronounced in a high-profile case about a 
drug mafia in the city of Kostanay. There were 16 people, ten of them were the former police 
detectives from the Department of the fight against drug trafficking, who patronized drug 
dealers. They received between two and 16 years of imprisonment with confiscation of 
property and deprivation of ranks. Drug dealers, namely six women patronized by the 
convicted police officers, were sentenced to terms from eight to 20 years for a large-scale 
heroin trade operation with daily revenue of 1 million tenge (Gribovskaya 2014). Initially, 
more than 20 people were brought into the courtrooms. However, as a result of prosecution 
inability to prove their guilt those people were able to avoid legal responsibility. In May 
2014, the General Prosecutor criticized the Ministry of Internal Affairs for its inability to 
fight international drug-trafficking groups functioning on Kazakhstani territory (Ak Orda, 
2013). Nevertheless, in the context of newly discovered evidence the Committee of National 
Security has reinitiated this scandalous criminal case in 2015. This time it is approximately 
30 people are put into charge of cooperation and support of illicit drug trading crime groups. 
The case is ongoing. In particular, in December 2015 were prosecuted the head and a superior 
detective of city anti-drug police department both of whom have been able to escape from 
criminal responsibility in 2014 (Kovalskaya 2015, Stepanova 2015).  But this is not an 
isolated criminal case. Several other cases against high-ranking MVD officials who had 
created criminal groups within their departments have been published in mass media on 
regular basis. The size of such criminal groups is estimated to range between 30 and 50 active 
members, which means that these are sophisticated criminal operations involving significant 
flows of cash and influence. 
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How can we explain this mixed record: successful yet protracted criminal prosecution 
of some (but not other) corrupt police officers who have been protecting organized crime 
groups in what many view as corrupt political system? Who really fights organized crime and 
who protects it? What motivates some law-enforcement officers to engage in organized crime 
while other law-enforcement officers to go after their colleagues using criminal justice 
system? What is the role of legal rules, if they are both subverted by corrupt officials and 
followed by honest officials, even if these rules may hinder successful prosecution? What are 
the barriers against combatting both corruption and transnational drug trafficking in modern 
Kazakhstan? What does it mean to say that police in Kazakhstan are involved in the drug 
trade? What constitutes this involvement? 
By addressing these empirical questions, we could learn more about how and why 
combatting organized crime works or does not work in authoritarian and corrupt regimes. 
More broadly, why are some institutions (formal and informal) more influential and effective 
than others? Therefore, we could advance our theoretical understanding of the relationship 
between law and politics in non-democracies. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
To address the above-mentioned questions in a comprehensive manner, I analyze the state of 
existing research in three areas: studies of politics and government in Kazakhstan and other 
post-Soviet states, comparative criminal justice studies of police corruption and discretion, 
and criminological analysis of organized crime with the focus on corrupt networks and illegal 
drug trade. Observers of post-Soviet politics tend to explain corrupt networks of officials and 
their prosecution through the mismatch between formal and informal rules, incentives, 
institutions, and practices.  Some scholars claim that underlying problem is the 
ineffectiveness of formal rules and institutions that were created to enhance capacity of law 
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enforcement. Some political scientists who focus on the functioning of political institutions in 
transitional regimes have reached consensus that if formal political institutions are 
ineffective, there must be some informal political institution substituting them (Crawford and 
Ostrom 1995, Ledeneva 2001, Lazarini 2004). Informal institutions arise when formal 
institutions fail to solve some kind of a problem. Moreover, “the distinct mechanisms of 
informal institutional influence ought to be distinguished from the outcomes of such 
interactions: formal institutions might be weakened or reinforced by informal rules, but the 
effectiveness of formal institutions is an outcome, not a prediction, of formal-informal 
interactions. In transitional settings, formal institutions are at least partially influenced by 
informal rules, and their effectiveness cannot be assumed” (Grzymala-Busse 2010, 331).  
Where does this mismatch come from? Several authors argue that this mismatch – 
dominance of informal practices over formal rules – is the product of Soviet legacies (Arnold 
2015, Kupatadze 2015, Ledeneva 2013, Taylor 2011). Lysova and Shchitov (2012) argued 
that police had vast investigative and punitive powers yet it was punished for unsolved 
crimes, lacked human and financial resources, and as a result post-Soviet police has become 
even more corrupt than its Soviet-era predecessor. Other scholars argue that as a result of 
strong top-down Communist Party control before 1991 many parts of law enforcement 
system developed strategies to help them meet requirements of the Communist Party 
Apparatus, not aspirations to achieve the rule of law, as declared in many post-Soviet 
constitutions (Lysova and Shchitov 2015, Solomon 2015). For example, Solomon (2015) 
argued that Russia and Ukraine were not able to overcome roots of the excessive power of 
investigators and deficiency of judges as a result of inability to adapt to democratic standards 
after the Soviet Union collapse. Moreover, Soviet legacies help explain why the Committee 
of National Security (KNB), the successor of the Soviet Union’s KGB, which enjoyed a 
superior status in the Soviet law-enforcement system was capable to investigate and 
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prosecute MVD officials (Taylor 2011). Indeed, as I will argue in my thesis, these strategies 
still dominate in Kazakhstan and other post-Soviet states. Thus, the legacies argument helps 
partly explain the existing state of affairs in Kazakhstan’s law-enforcement system. Legacies 
alone do not fully explain this outcome, since there were parts of the former Soviet Union, 
which were able to overcome them. So, there must be some deeper reasons conditioning such 
a prolonged influence. 
Indeed, some scholars find that criminal prosecution of law enforcement officials is a 
result of pursuing the interests of political elites, including elites connected with organized 
crime groups (Ceccarelli 2007, Cheloukhine 2008, Corridi 2007). These explanations would 
view any successful prosecutions of corrupt police and organized crime groups as an 
extension of inter-elite struggles. In fact, “a peculiarity of Kazakhstan’s political elite is that 
it was never an internally consistent monolith, but consisted of different groups, subgroups, 
and key personalities, whose level of influence directly depended on their degree of 
proximity to the main center of political decision making—the country’s president” 
(Satpayev 2007, 288). Moreover, “certain corrupt practices and other violations of the law 
may signal the absence of a Western bureaucracy, but do not necessarily imply absence of or 
weakness of administrative hierarchy… Graft creates novel opportunities for leaders to exert 
informal pressure on their formal subordinates” (Darden 2008, 38-42). According to this 
view, we should not see any protracted criminal prosecutions or dropped criminal charges 
because the law would not matter, only elite interests would. Since, for example, in 
Kyrgyzstan “law enforcement bodies were formidable tools for amassing resources. 
According to an Akayev-era colonel in the security service, the presidential family destroyed 
the national law enforcement system and replaced it with a corrupt law enforcement clan. The 
highest leaders of law enforcement agencies were appointed by Akayev to protect the 
interests of the presidential family and its entourage” (Engvall 2011, 131). Bribes or threats 
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from above could quickly solve any problems instead of lengthy legal proceedings. Shelley 
(2002) argues that corruption, imperfect legislation (a product of corrupt decision-makers), 
conflicts between different corrupt law-enforcement agencies, and widely disseminated 
informal practices do not allow to seriously fight transnational crime. Moreover, “strategic 
interactions between corrupt officials affect the level of corruption - biding down bribes if 
they compete against one another, and increasing bribes if multiple bribes are required and 
officials are resilient: over time they adapt to changes in their environments, in some cases 
offsetting anti-corruption policies with new agencies for seeking out rents” (Olken and Pande 
2011, 37). However, the “inter-elite struggles” argument does not completely explain why 
both legal rules and attention to judicial scrutiny of evidence mattered in the first Kostanay 
case, why the KNB investigators spent so much effort on seeking for evidence for the 
subsequent cases, and why in every case prosecutors often lessened charges if they believed 
that the evidence was weak. For example, Wilson (2012) claimed that there were some 
deviance from entirely autocratic behavior in the Russian courts and law enforcement. As a 
result of remoteness from the central regions, elites cannot seriously affect decisions made by 
judges, who might have a broader room to maneuver and be motivated by their legal 
consciousness, not raw power considerations (Wilson 2012). In short, explanations centered 
on Soviet legacies, bureaucratic politics, or inter-elite struggles are incomplete: the first two 
overemphasize continuity (corrupt yet inefficient police) while the third one overemphasizes 
change (swift punishment of supporters of the losing elite). 
One possible explanation, which emphasizes ideas rather than interests, to explain 
why some law-enforcement officials cooperate with their colleagues in protecting organizing 
crime or while others prosecute their colleagues can be found in the theory of Esprit de’Corps 
among law enforcement officials. The key argument is that corruption among law-
enforcement agencies and its prosecution depends on the nature and level of corporate culture 
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and mutual trust between agencies (Juncos and Pomorska 2014). Such an approach would 
shed a light on why some institutions are less effective than others (i.e. comparisons among 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Procuracy, and the KNB and competition/cooperation among 
them). For example, “police departments can be overwhelmingly determined by a 
homogenous occupational subculture, subculture shaped by the nature of the job itself and 
marked by paranoia, insularity, and intolerance. These beliefs tend to lessen the effectiveness 
of departments” (Sklansky 2006, 1213). Given that, it is obvious that law enforcement 
ineffectiveness may be resulted from the disincentive and underpaid police officers. Also, it 
is critically important to take into consideration multidimensionality of the military and 
police professional. In fact, “at the interpersonal level, military profession is based upon 
experience, responsibility, and uniform group behavior. At the interpersonal and extra-
personal level, it must be defined in relation to its background. Still in the military institution 
most of functions more or less commanded by officers” (Sørensen 1994, 613). This 
peculiarity leads to the idea that such a corporate culture may have positive effect on the fight 
against crime, but at the same time serve as a fertile ground for corruption and cooperation 
with organized crime groups. Moreover, participation in crime influence individual values 
(Walters 2015). Consequently, when certain group of police officers participate in corrupt 
practices it may result in emergence of organization values substitution and establishment of 
cooperation code and corrupt actions coverage in order to save the reputation of the whole 
agency (Wood 2000). In short, organizational culture could be both the cause and effect of 
both inter-agency cooperation, which is necessary for combatting any complex crimes, 
including drug trafficking, and inter-agency competition, which is necessary for monitoring 
corruption. These, however, are necessary conditions but not sufficient ones for making 
police more or less corrupt and more or less effective.  
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There is an alternative explanation of the individual police officers motivations and 
effectiveness while serving their public duty and crime consequences elimination. “In 
circumstances where the police believe that a community does not deserve services, the 
community gets a lower level of services from the police… Current organizational reward 
policies and practices are not effective instruments in motivating its members to be more 
responsive. Possible causes of this might be the perception of officers that rewards are not 
distributed according to fair procedures of that higher responsiveness does not necessarily 
lead to obtaining organizational rewards” (Tasdoven and Kapucu 2013, 525-539). Moreover, 
police “legitimacy is not just granted… to the police as a whole, but is granted variably to 
individuals and groups within the police” (Harkin 2015, 604). Even in democracies 
undercover police operations and secrecy may make the public skeptical of their activities 
and as a result harm both public and officers (Joh 2009). Meanwhile, in non-democratic 
regimes criminal justice system in general might be severely discredited as a result of 
unbalanced power structure and weak rule of law (Hu and Dai 2014). Also, Harkin (2015) 
had argued that historical legacy may influence the social relationship between police and 
public, but this factor was overlooked by many other scholars. These arguments lead to an 
idea that individual and systemic ideas influence police motivations and capabilities while 
fighting transnational crime.  
Finally, there is a literature that modern states alone are too weak to combat 
transnational organized crime, like drug trafficking. Combatting it effectively would require 
elimination of unemployment, poverty and transitional nature of economy (Mohapatra 2007); 
overcoming of corruption and exploitation of state structure for criminal business (Morris 
2012, Paoli 2007); and destruction of borders’ penetrability and cooperation between drug-
traffickers and terroristic groups (Paoli 2002). This means that to effectively address the 
research question is impossible without taking into consideration of higher-level politics, 
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rather than simply focusing on formal state’s institutional structure. For example, some argue 
that negative performance of Russian police is not result of corruption, but rather of imperfect 
legislation, which makes police incapable of addressing and prosecuting new types of crimes 
such as transnational crime (McCarthy, 2010). I have analyzed many newspaper reports and 
interviews with key law enforcement officials which provide various estimates of drug trade 
in Central Asia. In fact, Kazakhstani, Kyrgyzstani and Tajikistani officials were blaming 
geographic proximity, widely-disseminated corruption, natural growth of drug-containing 
plants and huge volume of heroin manufactured in Afghanistan.  
Related to the “weakness of post-Soviet state” argument is the idea advanced by 
several Russian and Post-Soviet criminologists that post-Soviet societies have a widely 
disseminated and strongly established informal criminal culture, something that does not 
exist in the West (Shemyakina 2010, Romanova 2013, Taibakov 2011). Shemyakina (2010) 
argued that due to massive repressive imprisonment requested by Communist Party and 
inhumane character of the Soviet Criminal Code many people had served their terms in 
prison. After release from prison, their life style had been seriously affected by so-called 
“prison legislation” or informal prison norms. The main purpose of this prison legislation 
remains to increase authority of high-ranking criminals and to establish the discipline among 
criminals. As a result of economic crisis and undeveloped civil society people stick with rules 
which are clearer than contradictory state policies. Also, more and more teenagers prefer to 
follow rules of criminal world. There are many schools and even cities, where people prefer 
to obey rules of criminal world instead of formal political institutions (Taibakov 2011). As 
far as older population groups are concerned, there is a pattern that released people usually 
collect money and send them to the prisons in order to support those criminals who don’t 
have any connections outside of prisons. Consequently, it makes a perception that this 
informal criminal culture had substituted drawbacks of post-soviet states’ transitional politics 
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and now recognized by society as more trustworthy than official politics of the state. More 
surprisingly, even high-ranking politicians such as Vladimir Putin and other several city 
mayors have been affected by the influence of criminal culture. They were using the criminal 
language in the official press-releases and their approval rankings became higher (Khanipov 
2008, Taibakov 2011). So, today these criminal culture dominates in many social spheres in 
Russia. However, how do carriers of this criminal culture operate, recruit and cooperate with 
other public and private actors? Initially, they adapt to the drawbacks of individuals and 
social system. Its followers may sometimes provide socially unprotected individuals with 
profits and give them a feeling of confidence and belonging (Taibakov 2011). In fact, certain 
feeling of inner integrity is forming as a result of constant interaction between criminal group 
members. Also, they are developing certain organizational identity and risk-minimizing 
strategies. Some groups were including members of law enforcements agencies in order to 
maximize profits of illicit business and to receive their protection (Romanova 2013). Such a 
trend would partly explain the reason of strong cooperation in the criminal world. However, 
despite the fact that “many forms of organized crime are financially attractive, they are not 
equally accessible for everyone, nor are they accessible in all stages of life” (Kleemans 2012, 
624). Kleemans (2012) also argued that economic models of organized crime overlook very 
important factors such as loyalty, fear and violence. Besides that, these types of legacies are 
still influential, it is important to highlight that “Cops, Chekists, and prosecutors are shaped 
not just by the past, but also by general pressures faced by law enforcement officials 
everywhere, and by broader social and institutional environment that is a complicated mix of 
old and new. Attention to these cross-national institutional similarities and to how a changing 
environment leads to institutional change gives us a more nuanced but ultimately more 
compelling understanding of legacies” (Taylor 2011, 148). In short, the nature of organized 
crime with its own culture, resources and hierarchy, may make its prosecution difficult and 
its appeal to police attractive. The less explored issue is how exactly this appeal works in an 
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authoritarian context where law-enforcement officials are expected to be loyal to the elites or 
to their relatives, not to drug dealers.  
I argue that understanding police corruption is an exercise of police discretion that 
depends on the combination of short-term incentives and organizational culture. Therefore, I 
develop hypotheses about police corruption as a collective practice, which take into account 
calculations of personal enrichment and career advancement in the context of engrained 
organizational norms, values and beliefs. Given that police corruption based on the proceeds 
of the illegal drug trade allows quick and significant enrichment, short-term incentives tend 
to dominate over broader concerns of harms of drug dealing. Thus, police faces vertical 
internal, vertical external, horizontal internal, and horizontal external factors, which 
lead to the choices police officers make when facing a vibrant and growing illegal drug 
trade.  
By vertical incentives I mean signals, inducements and threats that police officers 
receive from above. Statistical requirements and influence of police bosses on the 
involvement of their subordinates may encourage corrupt actions of police subordinates. 
Lower level officials are supposed to follow these signals due to their formal employment 
obligations and informal career pressures. As interview data had shown, the implementation 
of these incentives is very different from the picture represented by the official reports and 
speeches of police bosses. Vertical incentives will be sub-divided into vertical internal and 
external factors. By vertical internal factors I will mean the existence of factors which 
influence corrupt behavior of police officers from the higher levels of power. However, their 
influence is arise initially from the MVD itself.  On the other hand, there are obviously 
similar factors influencing the police performance from the outside such as the interest of the 
country’s leadership (or Ak-Orda) in the effectiveness of the anti-corruption campaign. These 
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factors will be categorized as vertical external ones because they are signals from outside of 
the MVD.  
Horizontal incentives are signals, rewards and threats, which police officers receive 
from everyone else besides their political superiors and MVD supervisors. These signals may 
come from drug dealers and their lawyers, the KNB investigators and prosecutors 
participating in anti-corruption campaigns against police officers, judges handling drug-
related cases, and journalists covering the crime stories. Horizontal internal incentives 
figure prominently in the daily routine of police officers. They include expectations of mutual 
cover-up or “krugovaya poruka” and strong loyalty to the peers, of sharing information about 
the drug trade, and public image protection, and so on. Importantly, police learn about these 
incentives while they are being trained in the Police Academies. In contrast, horizontal 
external incentives consist of the formal rules of the Criminal Code and Criminal Procedural 
Code as applied by judges and competition among law enforcement agencies such as 
Procurator Office and the Committee of National Security. These two agencies possess 
different professional obligations and subcultures from the MVD. And they have formal 
powers and informal levers to influence the performance of police in the sphere of illicit drug 
trade through broad investigative, oversight, and prosecutorial powers. These incentives 
become meaningful once police learns about the high probability of being punished for 
corruption and cooperation with drug dealers. These incentives may also include signals from 
mass media that covers crime and corruption stories. Finally, the proliferation of the illegal 
drug marketplace sends a clear wealth-generating signal to police officers. I treat this 
incentives as horizontal external because police officers and drug dealers become like 
business partners yet both sides maintain a significant relational distance. 
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Four Hypotheses 
Based on this framework, I propose the following four hypotheses explaining 
discretion of law-enforcement officials, and, more precisely, their choice to cooperate with or 
to punish drug dealers. 
Hypothesis 1 (Legacies + bureaucratic politics = decision to cooperate with drug dealers): 
Internal incentives may make police fake criminal statistics and not focus on serious drug 
trafficking.  
Hypothesis 2 (Interests + financial and career benefits = decision to cooperate with drug 
dealers): Informal expectations of police bosses as well as external incentives from drug 
dealers may encourage police to cooperate with drug dealers. 
Hypothesis 3: (Organizational culture + financial and career benefits = decision to cooperate 
with drug dealers): Police may cooperate with drug dealers because of shared culture of 
prison underworld: values, norms and practices. 
Hypothesis 4: External incentives from other government agencies (risk of criminal 
prosecution = decision to punish drug dealers), human rights NGOs and mass media (public 
exposure of fake criminal cases and of police corruption = decision to punish drug dealers) 
may discourage collusion between police and drug dealers. 
 
Key Concepts 
Let me specify the key concepts, which I use in my thesis: legacies, bureaucratic incentives, 
corruption, esprit de corps, organizational culture, law enforcement officer, drug dealer, drug-
dealing, elites, and organized crime. 
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To begin with, I will apply definition of legacy given by Taylor (2011). He argued 
that “the notion of legacy suggests something retained from the past. Legacies in this sense 
should be present everywhere, yet we most often hear the word legacy in cases such as “post-
colonial legacies” and “post-communist legacies.” Thus, it appears that the term applies 
primarily after major historical breaks. These legacies could exist both at the formal level, in 
terms of laws and organizations, and at the informal level, in terms of culture and everyday 
practice (Taylor 2011, 1). Such legacies are usually include selective law enforcement, 
statistical evaluation of officers’ performance, inter-agency competitions (Ledeneva 2013, 
McCarthy 2015, Taylor 2011).  
International non-governmental organization Transparency International (2015) 
defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” and classifies it as 
“grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it 
occurs.” In my research project I will use this definition because law enforcement officials 
had exploited power given to relevant agencies in order to satisfy their personal needs.  
Elites are “minority groups, each with its inner group of leaders, which attempt to 
exert some influence, legitimate or otherwise, over the allocation of values in a society” 
(Parry 2005, 13). In Kazakhstan, elites are sometimes top members of clans, but they also 
consist of oligarchs and members of the president’s circle would be considered as elites 
(Satpayev 2007; Schatz 2004; Olcott 2010). The KNB and MVD chiefs as well as the 
Procurator-General and the Supreme Court Chairman are considered to be members of the 
elite. During the time of these prosecution there had been administrative apparatus of the 
MVD and the KNB. In fact, in February 2012 General Matkenov became a head of the 
Kostanay Oblast Police Department and in March 2013 General Mizanbayev became a head 
of the Kostanay Oblast KNB.  Previously, General Mizanbayev was a deputy head of the 
Kazakhstan’s KNB, while General Matkenov led the Akmolinskaya Oblast Police 
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Department in the city of Kokshetau, which is considerably closer to Astana than Kostanay 
is. 
Unlike the concepts above, police officer’s definition is clearer. Taking into 
consideration the fact that in this research project mainly investigates Kazakhstani law 
enforcement, police officer is defined as a “a citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan who is 
actively employed law enforcement agency and has been awarded a special rank, class rank 
or a set of qualification class” (The Law of Republic of Kazakhstan about Law Enforcement 
Service 2011). More precisely, as it has been specified in the “Law about operational-search 
activities of the Republic of Kazakhstan”, police detective is a police officer conducting 
series of disclosed and undisclosed actives in order to protect rights, freedoms and interests of 
state and individuals.  
Drug dealing is a complicated activity of illegal drug distribution. There is a hierarchy 
among drug dealers. The second category of drug dealers are those who package drugs in 
small doses, which runners sell or deliver police officers. Unlike runners, the packagers hide 
from police and frequently change their location to avoid being either busted by honest police 
and KNB or raided by corrupt cops extorting cash and/or drugs. The third category are drug 
lords - high-level drug distributors, who control less important ones and buy heroin in 
portions considerably more than 1 kg. Besides that, these group had an access to higher level 
police officers and could threaten lower level police officers. 
Drug-trafficking is “a global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, 
distribution and sale of substances which are subject to drug prohibition laws” (UNODC, 
2015). The 1997 Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, under which the Kostanay 
police officers have been prosecuted, had specified the punishment for illicit drug trade: 
“illegal acquisition, transportation or storage for the purposes of marketing, manufacture, 
processing, shipment or selling of narcotic substances or psychotropic substances committed: 
a) by a group of persons on a prior collusion; b) several times; c) in relation to narcotic 
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substances or psychotropic substances in a large quantity, - shall be punished with 
deprivation of freedom for a period from seven to twelve years with confiscation of property” 
(Art. 259); “Illegal purchase, transportation or storage for the purposes of marketing, 
manufacture, processing, shipment or selling of narcotic substances or psychotropic 
substances, committed: a) by an organized group or a criminal community (criminal 
organization); b) in relation to narcotic substances or psychotropic substances in especially-
large quantity, - shall be punished with deprivation of freedom for a period from ten to fifteen 
years with confiscation of property” (Art. 260). In the 2015 Criminal Code, in the article 297, 
the punishment for this crime is more severe ranging between five and 25 years of 
deprivation of freedom depending on the number of people and amount of drugs involved. 
Finally, Esprit de Corps as a key element of police organizational culture means 
“feeling of solidarity…of belonging to a club” (Nuttall 2000, 272) and “shared beliefs and 
values among the individuals within a group and a desire among those individuals … to 
achieve a common goal” (Juncos 2014, 305). These shared feelings, beliefs and values 
among police detectives emerge through socialization and interaction with other police 
officers and with drug dealers. 
 
Research Design 
Kazakhstan is an ideal case for testing these hypotheses because we observe change in law-
enforcement while no change in drug trafficking. Also, deeper evaluation of the arguments 
resulted from analysis of: 
1) Two case studies of prosecutions of drug dealers and police officers in Kostanay. I used 
participant observation of court hearings and conducted 35 in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with individuals who are directly involved in the illicit drug trade sphere 
(investigators, detectives, defense attorneys, and the accused). This data collection 
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techniques allowed me to determine how and why police interacts with drug dealers and 
how and why decisions to prosecute corrupt police officers were made and 
implemented 
2) Interviewing government officials involved in the fight against the illicit drug trade was 
essential, since it has been publicly pronounced several times by the General 
Prosecutors office that most of available statistical data is unreliable. So, to obtain more 
accurate data about bureaucratic politics in the law-enforcement system I had to discuss 
problem with those who have built their careers in relevant spheres. As for criminals, 
interviews with this group had allowed me to gain insights into the culture and choices 
made by the police officers. 
3) Dataset of drug-trafficking criminal cases (crime registration, criminal sentence and 
damage caused by them in tenge) in Kazakhstan in the past 3 years from the web-site of 
Information Service of the Committee for Legal Statistics and Special Accounts of the 
Prosecutor General Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan (“Pravstat.kz”) was included 
to show nationwide patterns and more specifically in Kostanay. As a secondary method 
I used Inclusion of different archival materials from Prosecutors Office, Courts and 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Mass media reports about prosecution drug-trafficking 
criminal cases. These reports had allowed me to show nationwide patters and provided 
several hypotheses with supporting evidences. In particular, audio transcribes from 
court proceeding had recovered many names, strategies and techniques covered by 
corrupt police. In particular, 8 audio transcribes each of more than 3000 pages of court 
hearing stenographic report were evaluated in order to collect and identify significant 
amount of evidence.  
4) Dataset of 150 mass media articles about drug crimes and police corruption in 
Kazakhstan. Analyzing coverage of these issues in the newspaper articles allowed me to 
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compare police practices of joining organized crime and investigating it across the 
country in order to assess the uniqueness of the Kostanay criminal cases as well to 
analyze the relationship between police and the public. Also, I have relied on the 
published interviews with the law-enforcement officials in Kazakhstan and other post-
Soviet countries to examine the degree to which these practices and relationships exist 
in the post-Soviet region. 
5) Dataset of 57 criminal cases from the court archives helped me to understand the exact 
mechanism of prosecution of drug dealers and corrupt police and how agencies had 
acted during the investigation process. 
 
Research Ethics 
All names and cities of residence of interviewed persons was coded. List of codes, as well as 
the coding schema will be destroyed in one month after the research project’s termination. No 
identifying information about respondents had been mentioned in the research. Moreover, 
any audio-recording was destroyed right after coding of the conversation into written form 
within a three day period. These measures had assure that all the data is confidential. I have 
received Nazarbayev University Institutional Research Ethics Committee Approval for this 
research and I am taking a full responsibility to secure the anonymity of the interviewees.  
 
Needed Evidence 
Hypothesis 1: Internal incentives may make police fake criminal statistics and not focus on 
serious drug trafficking.  
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A considerable amount of literature about the Soviet Legacies in Post-Communist states and 
their influence on police operation had been carefully analyzed to find some evidence on 
structural incentives. Comparative evaluation of Soviet legislation helped me to find which 
formal institutions had conditioned an emergence of such practices. On the next stage, I 
developed series of interview questions to see whether practitioner experience their influence. 
Also, I analyzed drug-related criminal justice statistics. Low frequency of cases against 
groups with large amounts of drugs had indicated one key element of legacy: police lacks 
incentives to detect and investigate large-scale operations. High numbers of cases, which did 
not reach the courts, had indicated fake cases. As in Soviet period, official anti-corruption 
pronouncements from the top have little or no impact on behavior of street-level police 
officers. This had been displayed in the high level of criticism of police officers of the 
Criminal Code and of the Criminal Procedure Code, and official directives from the top. On 
30 January 2013 the General Prosecutor of the Republic of Kazakhstan strongly criticized the 
activities of various law enforcement agencies during official meeting of the president and 
heads of various law enforcement agencies. According to him, the agencies were not able to 
meet and overcome the danger of transnational crime as a result of high levels of corruption 
and the professional incapacity of police officers. President Nazarbayev took this criticism 
into consideration and decided to organize a wide recertification of law enforcement 
employees (Ak Orda 2013).  However, this recertification may have been conducted in the 
Soviet bureaucratized way and protected relatives and cronies instead of encouraging serious 
cleansing of police force.  
Hypothesis 2: Informal expectations of police bosses as well as external incentives from drug 
dealers may encourage police to cooperate with drug dealers. 
The confirmation of this hypothesis required to find answers for following questions. Have 
police officers been hired on merit or because of bribes/connections? How much does police 
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appointment cost and who keeps the bribe? Engvall (2011) argued that in Kyrgyzstan “In 
2004, a ranking official in the Ministry of Internal Affairs commented on the dynamic at the 
top level of the system to international media: “If you want to become the deputy head of a 
district police department in the capital, it is enough to pay 10,000 dollars. And the post of 
deputy head of Bishkek’s internal affairs department costs 20,000 dollars.” Ranks are also up 
for sale. On the basis of these accounts, a distinction can be made between prospective 
officials who have some meritocratic and professional capacities to substantiate their claim 
on an office, as well as those who are completely unqualified and whose claim solely rests on 
personal contacts and the possession of money. In the former case, a candidate might be 
recommended for office on his merits, but the system of purchases means that the candidate 
is often required to back up his merits with cash (Engvall 2011, 118-119). Due to numerous 
common historical legacies, regional interdependence and other wide range of similarities 
between Central Asian states similar practices might had been observed in Kazakhstani 
police.  
As long as police bosses are probably at the top of any organization it might have 
been challenging to learn about their connections and influence on the organized crime 
groups. However, I had collected evidence about Central Asian states with an obvious 
domination of the police bosses in the illicit drug trade. I had also collected evidence of 
Kazakhization to show kin connections as well as the police academy’s learning about 
corruption and familial obligations. After that, media reports and questions covering elites’ 
involvement and strategies had been included into interview questionnaire. I needed to show 
if the law-enforcement elite has remained stable during the past five years: if yes, then inter-
elite struggle argument was weak; if its membership had changed, then the Kostanay cases 
might have been the outcomes of inter-elite struggles. To trace the influence of police bosses, 
the key indicator of elite interests’ presence have been a command of major law enforcement 
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personnel to prosecute corrupted officials, so-called ‘komanda sverkhu’ what is in fact an 
order from top. I needed evidence of who issued the order, who was appointed in place of 
prosecuted police officers and what had happened with former department’s head. 
Hypothesis 3: Police may cooperate with drug dealers because of shared culture of prison 
underworld: values, norms and practices. 
Collecting money and sending money to the top is similar to the prison practice called 
“obshchak” which means criminals collect money and send it to the criminal bosses who are 
in prison. Police culture may be shaped by the opinion of general public and of peers in other 
government agencies. Kazakhstani police remains mistrusted not only by ordinary citizens, 
but by government officials as well. As it has been previously mentioned Askhat Daulbayev 
(General Procurator of the Republic of Kazakhstan) had pronounced numerous public 
criticism towards MVD officials.  Meanwhile, in Court archives I found a great variety of 
criminal cases, where the exact mechanism of prosecution were described. So, it will be 
possible to trace how agencies had acted during the investigation process. I analyzed these 
cases in attempt to find when the presence or absence of certain type of subculture had 
influenced an outcome of the investigation. Meanwhile, interviews helped me to find out 
what officers think about the importance of the Esprit de Corps, such as salaries, legal 
protections, professional pride and job satisfaction and so on, and the ways of improving it 
within these agencies will be included. It will allow me to recognize to what extent 
subculture has an impact on the quality of investigation and prosecution of drug criminals.  
Loyalty and honor can be different for different people but may be similar to police 
detectives who interact with criminals on a daily basis. Mutual protection and cover-up 
(krugovaya poruka), blackmailing, provocations (kontrol’naya zakupka), transferring money 
to higher police officials in order to buy positions are all processes impossible to hide unless 
there is some of intention to cover  illicit actions of each other. Consequently, there is a 
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probability that law enforcement officials may perceive and exploit these definitions in a 
manner advantageous for them and, as a result, may become even more corrupted. I had 
interview corrupted officials and their lawyers to find a presence of such a manipulated 
understanding of Esprit de Corps and its influence on the investigation process.   
Hypothesis 4: External incentives from other government agencies, human rights NGOs and 
mass media may discourage collusion between police and drug dealers. 
Evidence that higher risk of criminal prosecution of police corruption on by KNB, Procuracy 
and judges is likely to motivate police punishing drug dealers is likely to be obtained from 
both formal sources, like speeches, meetings, court records and mass media articles, and 
informal sources, such as interviews and participant observation of criminal trials. This risk 
may be increased by the actual anti-corruption drive of the country’s leadership and by 
increased inter-agency rivalries, which may in part be cultivated by different organizational 
cultures and practices. Also, public exposure of fake criminal cases and police corruption by 
human rights NGOs would encourage police to punish drug dealers, not to cooperate with 
them. 
Context: Criminal Prosecutions against Corrupt Police Officers 
The massive anti-corruption campaign in Kazakhstan became more active during previous 
five years. For several political reasons president Nazarbayev administration has decided to 
improve the quality of state service (Ak Orda 2013). As a result, strictly controlled mass 
media sources were publishing reports sharing the light on various mechanisms implied by 
corrupted officials from nearly each department and ministry on the monthly basis. The scale 
of this corruption campaign is in fact dramatic. Day by day it continues to grow. However, 
what remains surprising is that political institutions remain corrupted and public trust is 
declining in the same manner as it was before a beginning of the national program devoted to 
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the fight against corruption. As it has been already mentioned nearly each Ministry was 
affected by this campaign.  
However, one of them deserves our particular attention. It is the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs. By definition, MVD supposed to protect ordinary citizens from criminals and in case 
a criminal act will take place they are those who are obliged to take actions in order to fulfill 
the justice and maintain the rule of law. Not surprisingly, as in many post-soviet states 
concepts of rule of law and justice are understood in a very peculiar manner. That is why 
sometimes complaint may turn into criminal case and vice versa depending on the decision 
made by police officer. Their mood is easily affected by charitable bribes, the amount of 
those changing as often as the devaluation of national currency takes place. That is how the 
normal operation of the MVD looks like from the first glance. Despite the fact that nearly 
each citizen had adapted to these quite comfortable legal practices compared to the 
contradictory legislation, the criminal prosecutions of corrupted police offices had eventually 
took place. In this chapter I am going to provide a reader with a detailed description of high-
scale criminal prosecutions against police officers involved into illicit drug trade. These cases 
will be also compared to the less significant but nevertheless scandalous criminal 
prosecutions of the officers participating in organized crime as drug gang members. In such 
circumstances the reader should remember that the distinctive line between honest and 
corrupt police officer is sometimes very thin. That is why the description of their activities 
will be followed by an analysis of structural pre-conditions of such a disappointing outcome. 
Finally, analysis of two contradictory, but still interrelated subcultures in the face of police 
culture and informal criminal culture will be represented in this paper.  
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Chapter 2 Internal Incentives and External Incentives from Drug Dealers 
May Encourage Police Corruption and Collusion with the Organized Crime 
 
My exploration of corrupt police practices had proven that the scale of power abuse is, in 
fact, massive and depends on formal and informal internal incentives as well as external 
signals and rewards from drug dealers. Police officers from several agencies and departments 
were involved into illicit activities in the same manner and regularity as ordinary criminals. 
The only thing which had protected them from externally produced legal responsibility were 
limited capabilities of judges, prosecution and the decisions of criminals-fellow police 
officers (internal horizontal incentives) acting as main witnesses not to reveal the names of 
all police officers who had been colluding with the drug dealers. So, the mere structure of 
Law Enforcement system in Kazakhstan may encourage some police officers to participate in 
illegal drug trade that allows for quick and significant enrichment (external horizontal 
incentives).  
To recap, vertical incentives are signals, threats and rewards that police officers 
receive from above. Statistical requirements and influence of police bosses on the 
involvement of their subordinates may encourage corrupt actions of police subordinates. 
Lower level officials are supposed to follow these signals due to their formal employment 
obligations and informal career pressures. By vertical internal factors I will mean the 
existence of factors which influence corrupt behavior of police officers from the higher levels 
of power. However, their influence is arise initially from the MVD itself. These practices 
appear prominently in the daily routine of police officers. They include expectations of 
mutual cover-up or strong interdependence between officers, sharing information about the 
drug trade, and public image protection, and so on. Importantly, police learn about these 
incentives while they are being trained in the Police Academy or during first years of actual 
field work experiences. 
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Finally, the proliferation of the illegal drug marketplace sends a clear wealth-
generating signal to police officers. I treat this incentives as horizontal external because 
police officers and drug dealers become business partners yet both sides maintain a 
significant relational distance with police officers carrying a threat of punishing drug dealers. 
Drug dealers like Ms. Asylbaeva had used corrupt MVD officials in return for systematic 
transfer of heroin and money to them through distributors. Also, heroin was delivered at the 
request of police officers and drug addicted individuals supervised by them. The size of these 
bribes varied from one to 350 thousand tenge. Also, with her approval and permission, police 
officers were given heroin in large sizes as illegal remuneration for the suppression of crime 
measures stipulated by the law, assistance in ensuring the activity of an organized group by 
other members of this criminal gang. Moreover, traditional system allowed certain police 
officers to introduce themselves to drug dealers in order to ask for monthly and occasional 
payments. On average, each police officer has its own price that depends on their officer rank 
and departmental position they hold. However, despite the fact that they had monthly duty-
payment from drug dealers the situation when they call dealers without any previous 
agreement demanding for more money was not rare. Different types of personal expenditures 
of police officers were sponsored by drug dealers. In fact, weddings, daily expenses on food, 
gasoline and so on, were generously paid by criminals. 
 
Faking Crimes, Statistics and Witnesses 
As many post-Soviet states, Kazakhstan still uses formal statistical evaluation of police job 
performance (Taylor 2011). In reality, this system does not represent an actual amount of 
effort and time spent by police officer. Departmental statistical indicators are not even 
capable to reflect the professional capacity of the officers. In most general terms there is 
specified amount crimes needed to be investigated by the police. The scale and the overall 
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damage of crime are less relevant in this situations. These statistical key figures are supposed 
to be met and improved each month. Departments, which fail to meet the previous year’s 
quotas, are strongly criticized by the MVD leadership. Most often, the department heads face 
a real risk of demotion while their subordinates receive written reprimands for 
ineffectiveness. The race to meet departmental statistical quotas encourages police to 
fabricate criminal cases. All that the police officer needs is a fact of committed crime, 
something that can be fabricated easily. For this purpose police officers had developed 
different strategies to meet these required quotas. In fact, scandals in the sphere of fabricated 
criminal cases are observed regularly across Kazakhstan. The story below is typical. 
In October 2014, police officer, Anuarbek Bakhmanov, came from Astana to 
Zhambylskaya oblast’ in order to find a channel of marihuana contraband trafficking from 
Kazakhstan to Russia. He had intelligence data to the relevant case, but was not able to find 
suspects. So, he had decided to find an alternative solution. He had asked for help his 
colleague who was working with former drug addicts, but nevertheless, police agents. One of 
them was Stanislav Kharlampidi. Bakhmanov had asked him to find a person who will be 
able to bring 10 kilogram of marihuana across the Russian border. The first portion deliverer 
was supposed to left in Kurgan, and the second one in Yekaterinburg. In each case the person 
would be paid 3000 US dollars. Each step of this strategy Kharlampidi was supposed to 
explain to agreed person, except one sufficient detail. This person would be captured on the 
crime scene in Yekaterinburg.  Most probably this scenario would succeed. However, 
Kharlampidi was a double agent. At the same time he was involved into operation organized 
by the Zhambyl Oblast KNB. So, when Bakhmanov was transferring bag with drugs to 
Kharlampidi he was captured by the KNB for falsification of intelligence data, power abuse 
and transportation and storage of illicit drug substances (Vybornova 2015).   
In this case we do observe that the situation is risky in itself. No individual is 
protected in the system which allows servants of justice to implement strategies similar to 
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above mentioned one. On the other hand, there are even more sufficient aspect. Scandals 
regarding falsification of criminal cases have occurred in other regions as well. This fact have 
lead us to idea, that most probably these were not decisions of several dishonest police 
officers, but rather the whole operating in entirely wrong manner. So, let’s analyze several 
similar criminal court proceedings with police officers faking criminal statistics. The race to 
comply with formal statistical indicators is not limited to criminal cases alone. For example, 
in Karaganda 2015 two police officers were prosecuted for abuse of power and falsification 
of administrative cases. In fact, this case describes in a quite detailed manner which measures 
are available for police officers willing to show to their bosses effectiveness and 
professionalism. However, anti-corruption agency had released recently that Seitkaliyev had 
falsified one administrative case, while Khaipova had faked nearly 13 administrative cases. 
Despite undeniable evidence, these police officers do not agree with charges filed against 
them. Most surprisingly, in this criminal cases were found results of different forensic 
examinations and nonexistent evidences (Moskovka 2015).  
Even though the above mentioned case is not relevant to the illicit distribution of 
drugs, it clearly shows the initiatives police officers experience while serving their duty. In 
reality, nearly each officers is supposed to improve their statistical data regularly. So, there is 
growing perception that the system in itself forces them to employ their imagination and 
abuse power just to save their jobs. While collecting more data for my thesis I discovered this 
practice of fabricated evidence have been developed long ago before the official prosecution 
and media press releases took place. The following story illustrates how police trades drugs 
in exchange for fulfilling departmental statistical quotas. 
In 2009, Deputy Manager of “Kyzyl Zhar” customs station in Severno-
Kazakhstanskaya oblast’ so desperately wanted to improve statistical indexes of crime 
detection rate so he decided organize illicit trafficking of heroin through his own station. 
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Later on, members of this crime group were supposed to be captured by him. According to 
the criminal case, he had immediately begun search of drug addicts who would agree to 
provide him with drug delivery men in return for small heroin doses, estimating nearly 0,2 
gram. Also, in case drug delivery men would be provided on regular basis, he would pay 
assistance 1,000 US dollars monthly. However, he had no idea that all this time he was 
controlled by the KNB, while heroin doses given by him were transferred to the agents from 
the KNB (Miroshnichenko 2009). 
Despite the fact that occasional prosecutions were taking place, police supervisors 
continue to tolerate such an outstandingly comfortable measure of investigation. Similarly, 
police officers in Kostanay had developed their own way to increase effectiveness of the fight 
against criminals in return for heroin doses. Several witnesses had testified that police 
officers were bargaining and faking criminal statistics in various ways. According to the trial 
court record: 
“Interrogated as a witness Mr. Eisenach had stated that he had met Nauryzbaev when 
he was arrested for theft and robbery. On the regular basis he was confessing in several 
crimes commitment, in return they gave him heroin. He does not remember how many times 
they called him. But quite often he was given heroin in return for confession (Criminal case 
number 1-1/2014). In fact, Nauryzbaev took him to the runners twice. Also, heroin was given 
to him by Sasha, who is runner wearing glasses. Usually Nauryzbaev was leaving out of the 
car, telling something to a runner. They immediately gave heroine without taking money 
from him. Sometimes he was put into prison for 24 hours, then they called to the runners and 
had a chance to inject heroin.  Later, he had met with Dzhambul. For bringing a stolen purse, 
they gave him 2 half-doses of heroin and agreed to meet on the next day. With 
Mukhamedzhanov they work in a very different manner. He was not afraid to go to the jail, 
since they said that everything will be fine” (Criminal case number 1-1/2014).  
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All faked criminal cases usually ended up in the reconciliation with the victim during 
the trial in the courtroom, which resulted in his release every time. At the very beginning, 
several police officers had suggested: “Let’s work in terms of disclosure of crimes, we will 
give you drugs and in return you confess to us.” Eisenach agreed to with this offer. As a 
result, he has been repeatedly convicted by the Kostanay city court for thefts of wallets at 
different bus stations. On the regular basis he was confessing and later released on the basis 
of reconciliation with the victims of his thefts (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). 
Such a shocking interrogation methods are usually denied by the officials claiming 
that these were isolated incidents. However, during this scandalous criminal proceeding the 
KNB had found a significant number of witnesses to uncover all horrible truth about real 
activities of police officers in Kostanay. One of these witnesses had shed more light on the 
“classified operational data.” In fact, a witness Kupreev had stated police officers did not 
catch runners, because they took money for living from them. He was not touched as well by 
them, because when he was committing a crime stealing something, for example, this case 
could remain unsolved. So, his part of agreement was to steal something and come to police 
officer saying where he had committed a crime and locate the stolen property. Gazizulin and 
Mnaydarov confiscating these stolen goods, and in return he was given heroin and money 
(Criminal case number 1-1/2014). Mnaydarov told him to contact him even and without 
committed crime episodes, he would give him heroin if it was needed. At that time he did not 
commit crimes, Mnaydarov had his interest in him. In fact, they came to him, when there was 
a theft and in return for previously given heroin, we must take on this theft and confess in the 
crime he did not commit. They said: “You confess and victims will choose reconciliation, 
while we will square our accounts with you.” Later on, a tape recorder was stolen near one 
popular shopping mall (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). He didn't know, who had stolen it. 
However, in the car he was shown this recorder by these officers and was compelled to 
confess. He had agreed, criminal case was opened against him and in the court, as it was 
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promised he had reconciled with the victims (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). Besides that, 
once when he was transferring 40,000 tenge to police officer named Kuanysh, there was 
another man present. They said that they would periodically contact him to appoint the place 
where he will have to stand up. After one of the addicts will buy heroin from him, they will 
arrest such an unlucky consumer. That was needed for their own personal job performance 
index (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). They needed that for statistical requirements. They 
said that everything will be fine, he should not have worried and work peacefully, no one will 
touch him. Later on, they called on his cell phone saying where I had to sell drugs. As they 
instructed “You stay here, we won’t be far away from you. When someone will take more 
heroin, approximately 5-6 doses of heroin, make a phone call with one dial tone and hang up 
(mayakuesh) and we detain that person” (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). The conclusion is 
quite obvious: there is a practice of cooperation between criminals and police officers in 
falsifying criminal statistics. Even though this practice did result in capturing actual drug-
buyers, in reality, allowing some criminals to sell heroin in order capture their buyers is the 
least expected outcome in the increased effectiveness of the law enforcement.  
Another practice that relates to the falsification of statistical indicators is planting drugs 
to fabricate easily solvable criminal cases and to extort cash from the victims of this practice. 
There were numerous scandals when police officers were tossing in drugs to ordinary people 
in many regions of Kazakhstan. In fact, the situation when low quality of criminal 
prosecution against drug related crimes had led to conviction of more resemble to innocent 
one rather than to the well-experienced drug distributor. Moreover, planting drugs also allows 
police to extort cash or illegal favors from the victims (another corrupt practice). In fact, I 
had found nearly ten scandals related to heroin tossing and following extortion of money 
from individuals. The summary of the newspaper article below describes this practice in 
Pavlodar, a city in North-Central Kazakhstan.  
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For nearly two years Pavlodar city’s judges were trying to receive more or less real 
evidences confirming the guilt of Mr. Yuri Kukshin from procurators and police officers. He 
had spent approximately 20 months in the pretrial detention center. According to the charge-
sheet, on the 2nd of June 2012, one especially responsible woman came to the police. At the 
same day, police officers, after assigning to this woman a nickname “Sidorova”, have begun 
their operation. They had given to her money, drop off till the house of drug dealer and 
remained waiting in the car. After a while, according to police version, Sidorova came back 
with package of heroin, which was given to detectives (Voronko 2014). On the 15th of June, 
Kukshin was apprehended with the heroin in his pocket at the same yard. Everything seemed 
clear, there were two video recordings. The court proceedings were supposed to be fast. 
However, the defense had looked closely to this video recording. The video camera was 
shaking from one side to another, capturing surrounding yards and houses. Periodically, this 
camera is capable to get an immediate arrest process, while on the 15th second it becomes 
possible to distinguish a hand of man dressed in civilian clothing holding an item very 
resemble to the heroin recovered from the suspect’s pocket (Voronko 2014). It has been 
found later, that this man in civilian dress was a detective from Pavlodar anti-drug 
department, police captain, named Murat Kozhanov.  However, the second, a detailed 
recording one had somehow disappeared. Kozhanov explained that during the arrest he 
helped three riot policemen clap handcuffs on Kukshin that is why he appeared in the video 
recording. Due to the customs existing in their police department they have to share a single 
video camera by 8 people (Voronko 2014). That is why detailed video recording with the 
arrest of Kukshin was substituted with a different recording. Sure, they had to be more 
responsible and use empty videotapes, but that time the arrest was immediate. So, his 
colleagues did not have a chance to see that there is already recorded movie in this camera. 
However, the judged had given a word to the witness Galina Chirikova, who had closely 
observed this arrest process (Voronko 2014). As she stated, there was a guy dressed in light-
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colored clothes. He was not resisting to them, while they had struck him down on the ground 
and begun beating him. “I came to them and ask them to be more carefully, not to abuse 
power so publicly. There was also one, dressed in black T-shirt. This man inclined above the 
suspect and put into his pocket something. I began talking to them. What are you doing? Are 
not you ashamed doing that? So many people are watching! Then, he replied to me. Go away, 
grandmother, go away. I came to another man dressed in the police uniform and begun asking 
him to stop it. He also replied to me. Where you were going, grandmother? To buy some 
bread. If so, go there then. I felt so bad after his words” (Voronko 2014). The judge was 
surprised that police officers did not take samples of drug test, even though the suspect 
insisted on them in order to prove that he did not touch the found package of heroin. After 
this court proceedings nearly one year and half had passed, prosecutor had retired, the 
investigators had been transferred to the prosecution office, while Kukshin still remains a 
suspect (Voronko, 2014). The court is constantly sending this case on an additional 
investigation, while police is still not able to find eight attesting witness mentioned in the 
criminal case. While recently the third judge on this scandalous criminal case Anuarbek 
Ospanov, called into question the convicting evidences. The reason was quite 
straightforward, he was able to observe heroin in the only available video recording 
submitted with the criminal case (Voronko 2014). This video was watched sharply during the 
very first court proceeding, however the defense was not allowed to repeat and reevaluate this 
movie. On this movie, Sidorova giving to police officers, not wrinkled package heroin made 
from welding paper. This package was absolutely empty. Few seconds later this bought 
heroin package is captured few second before the beginning of chemical expert evaluation. 
More surprisingly, the signature of detective Seitakhmetova, confirming the withdrawal of 
the evidence was moving easily from one place to another (Voronko 2014). The thing is that, 
on the very first photo, her signature was found on the exact place on the stamp, while on the 
second document written down before chemical evaluation of this package, her signature was 
32 
 
found on a very distant place compared to the first one. Completely confused judge had 
collected a group meeting with all participant of this case and instead of acquiring a prisoner 
had decided to give law enforcement one more chance (Voronko 2014). So, judge sent the 
case for supplementary investigation. If this time investigation was able to prove the guilt of 
suspect and explained absence the heroin in the video recording, but its presence in the 
chemical expertise, then it would mean that Kukshin had spent nearly 20 months in prison for 
a reason (Voronko 2014). 
What this Pavlodar story shows is how unprotected civilians are not only from 
criminals, but from these type of criminals in police uniforms. More importantly, I have 
found even more scandalous case covered in mass media with the implication of more 
sophisticated bribe extortion strategies.  
In the late evening of the 4th September 2007, around 23:00, Elena Kuznetsova went 
out to buy a dose of heroin and, as a result, was caught in flagrante by two young police 
lieutenants. They arrested Kuznetsova, and she confessed that she had begun injecting heroin 
in August and that she had found this particular heroin package at the intersection. She had 
picked it up and tasted it. When she realized that it was heroin, she decided to keep it. After 
that she was immediately captured by police officers. By a strange coincidence on the same 
street intersection there were two cute girls, who had agreed to become attesting witnesses 
and to follow all judicial formal procedures in order to capture a so-called drug dealer and to 
help police officers to fulfill their duty (Benditskii 2007). That was an official description of 
the events in the police documents. 
In turn, local journalists acting at the request of relatives of Ms. Kuznetsova conducted 
their own investigation. Journalists were surprised by a very strange manner of heroin 
identification by this young lady and by the fact that this 21-year-old had been positively and 
warmly characterized by her neighbors, relatives and friends, none of whom suspected her in 
the drug addiction (Benditskii 2007). Ms. Kuznetsova’s eye vision was -4, which made 
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searching for heroin on the dark streets a very challenging task for her. She had graduated 
from the high school with honor and earned the first honor degree at the University. So, it 
was difficult to connect the dots in this criminal case. The journalistic investigation had 
shaded a light on many more facts in this strange criminal case. After being captured by 
police officers, this young lady had voluntary declined the services of both free and paid 
lawyer (Benditskii 2007). In her testimony, she had stated that it was not connected in any 
way with her financial circumstances. In such a manner, all initial investigative procedures, 
in which she had admitted her drug addiction were conducted without a real defense attorney. 
Besides that, two ladies signed up as attesting witnesses in this criminal case, were not 
random strangers, as required by the Criminal Procedure Code. The first them was an intern 
in one of the police departments, while the second one came to the romantic date with one 
young police officer (Benditskii 2007). Finally, there were two individuals who had not been 
mentioned in the criminal case file - the taxi driver and a close friend of arrested lady. The 
most interesting piece of evidence in this criminal case is that forensic chemical examination 
did not reveal traces of drugs either in her blood or her body. Nor has she been registered as a 
drug addict in the local drug addiction clinic. So, with exception of her confessing testimony 
she was innocent without question. What became known later is the fact that the initiator of 
this trip was her friend. Journalists had found out that this friend Madina used to inject heroin 
for a long period of time and has been registered at the drug addiction clinic (Benditskii 
2007). Besides that, she was criminally prosecuted for the storage of illicit drug substances. 
This Madina was inducing naive Kuznetsova several days to accompany her in this trip. 
When Kuznetsova had finally agreed and hailed a cab, the taxi driver was changing the route 
several times. Finally, Madina asked the driver to stop. At that moment, she had thrusted 
money, coins and some strange piece of paper in Kuznetsova’s hands. Then, she had 
immediately left the car claiming that she urgently needed go to the hospital (Benditskii 
2007). Few seconds later, police officer had arrested Kuznetsova and told the taxi driver to 
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leave unless he was prepared to be charged as an accomplice to drug dealing. Madina was 
released. After these unwanted witnesses were send away, police officers took Kuznetsova, 
came to her house and invited her mother by a phone call for a negotiations. They demanded 
5000 USD for peaceful release of her daughter (Benditskii 2007). When she had told them 
that she did not have such an outstanding amount of money, they reduced price to 3000 USD. 
Kuznetsova’s mother did not have this amount. So, then this girl was transferred to other 
police officers and then the criminal investigation was initiated by completely different 
officers who found attesting witnesses, recorded the offense and launched investigation 
(Benditskii 2007). Fortunately, several people observed these falsifications, sent their 
testimonies into the department of internal security of the MVD. As a result, this department 
had initiated a criminal case against unknown (!) police officers abusing national interest and 
legal interests of Kuznetsova (Benditskii 2007). 
In this terrifying case, I had observed not only intention and attempts to falsify criminal 
statistics and extort bribes, but also the presence of one more variable interfering in dishonest 
police activities. In this case, the involvement of mass media actors and conduct of 
journalistic investigation provided horizontal external incentives influencing the corrupt 
activities of police. Unfortunately, the availability of this practice to the public did not make a 
significant difference in the police practices.  The example of abuse of power resulting in 
heroin trade by police officers had been revealed less than a year later.  In February 2008, the 
Committee of National Security (KNB) had organized two operations against corrupt police 
officers in Almaty. The head of the police departments in South East Internal Affairs 
Department on the transport, a police captain, with his senior sergeant have been passing 
heroin in the pockets of ordinary citizens and then extorting money from them for withdrawal 
of charge and understanding of the situation (Kuchyukov 2008). These police officers were 
absolutely confident in their safety that is they were always bringing heroin with them. The 
huge portion was peacefully stored in their car. They were arrested by the use of a straw 
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buyer, who had recently purchased from them several doses of heroin. While investigating 
this criminal case, the KNB has also uncovered their accomplice. All three of them were 
arrested (Kuchyukov 2008). 
 Finally, police uses the so-called “witness no. 100” (sotyi svidetel’) practice of 
abusing the secrecy of witnesses to improve their job performance statistics in terms of the 
number of solved cases, not the amount of drugs seized. The name of this practice derives 
from the Article 100 of the then Criminal Procedure Code. But before describing this practice 
let me explain the following. In most of developed state the effectiveness of the fight against 
illicit drug trafficking is estimated in the amount of drugs seized by the police. As one bright 
police investigator told me: 
“When I was sent to Hungary in order to improve my professionalism, I was 
surprised. Every time they talk about drug-trafficking they talk about dozens of 
kilos at least. In our department we usually work a considerably smaller portions. 
For example, the maximum amount was 2 kg of heroin only, while our routine 
usually looks like collecting and sending to the court cases involving doses 
between 1 and 10 grams… This is how our statistics works” (Respondent 1, July 
2015). 
The criminal liability of heroin distribution is specified in the Criminal Code of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan. Since 1991 this code has been changed several times. However, one 
thing remained the same. The gradation of drug distribution is still represented as distribution 
in small, large, and extra-large amount. This classification is specified in the separate 
document named Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 279-I, dated July 10, 1998, “On 
narcotic substances, psychotropic substances, precursors and countermeasures for their illicit 
trafficking and abuse.”  This classifications depends severely on the exact type of drugs 
which are distributed. As we see from the table heroin distribution is classified as 0-0.01 
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gram - small amount; 0.01 – 1.0 gram - large amount; and more than 1.0 gram – extra-large 
amount. This makes no distinction between portion of 1 gram and 1 kilograms in this type of 
evaluation. As a result, police is entirely captured in the fulfilling of statistical requirements 
and prefers to focus on the heroin distribution in the amounts slightly higher than 1 gram. 
This choice allows detectives to perform well from the bureaucratic point of view but does 
little to counteract medium-sized drug dealing.  
This drawback in the formal institutional arrangements had led to the emergence of the 
“witness no. 100” practice. As you can see from point 2 of Article 100 of the then Criminal 
Procedure Code below, it allows various law enforcements agencies to limit access to the 
information identifying witnesses, including to the biographic data of testifying witness. In 
theory, this article is supposed to protect citizens who are willing to contribute to report 
crimes by sharing information and protect them from retaliation by criminals. In reality, its 
implementation had been transforming into one more repressive institution of post-soviet 
criminal justice.  
Article 100. Security Measures with Regard to Victims, Witnesses, Suspects, 
Accused individuals and the Other Person who Participate in a Criminal Procedure 
(as amended by the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 7 April 2009 No. 149-IV) 
1. The following shall be applied as procedural security measures with regard to 
witnesses, suspects, accused individuals and other persons participating in criminal 
proceedings, their family members and immediate relatives: 
1) the passing of an official warning of possible criminal prosecution by the body 
conducting the criminal procedure to the person from whom the threat of violence or 
other acts prohibited by criminal law emanate; 
2) restriction of access to information concerning the person being defended; 
3) ensuring his personal security; 
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4) with regard to the accused (suspect) selection of the measure of restraint that 
excludes any opportunity to use (organize the use) violence or commission 
(organization of commission) of other criminal acts with regard to participants of the 
criminal procedure. 
2. The warning passed by the body conducting the criminal procedure shall be 
announced to the person against receipt. 
3. Restriction of access to information concerning the person being defended shall 
consist in the seizure of information concerning questionnaire information of the 
person from materials of the criminal case and their storage separately from the main 
proceeding, and in the use of pseudonym by that person. The materials separated 
from the principal proceeding may be accessible for the review only to the body that 
conducts the criminal procedure. Other participants of the proceedings may become 
familiar with them only with a permit of the body that conducts the criminal 
procedure when giving the recognizance not to disclose the said information. 
Procedural acts with the participation of the person being defended may be 
performed under conditions which exclude his identification. 
4. The procedure for ensuring personal security of witnesses, suspects, accused 
individuals and other persons who participate in a criminal proceeding and their 
immediate relatives shall be defined by law. 
5. Irrespective of the adoption of security measures, the criminal prosecution body 
shall be obliged to institute a criminal case, when there are sufficient reasons for it, 
due to the discovered threat of commission of an act prohibited by the criminal law 
with regard to a victim, witness, the accused, and any other person who participates 
in the criminal proceedings. 
6. Security measures shall be abolished by a motivated resolution of the body that 
conducts the criminal procedure when the need in their application disappears. A 
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person being defended must be immediately notified of the abolition of security 
measures with regard to him or disclosure of information about that person to 
persons who participate in the proceedings on a case. Filing a complaint on decision 
of the body conducting the criminal procedure on the abolition of security measures 
to a court or to a prosecutor by the person being defended shall suspend the 
execution of the appealed decision. 
The cover provided by this Article 100 allows police officers to improve statistical 
performance in drug-related crimes by sending a person protected by this article to buy 
heroin in small amounts from dealer. Strong criticism of this practice is related to the fact that 
police itself poking people to commit one of the most serious crimes. As one judge had 
complained to me in the interview:  
“Today, they do not capture real drug distributors. In reality, they put into 
prison people who are in the very strong need of treatment. These so-called 
distributors buy nearly 5-10 grams of heroin in order to lessen the price of drugs. 
However, on the paper they look like a highly influential drug distributors” 
(Respondent 11, August, 2015).  
As many witnesses testified during the trial in Kostanay, each detective supervises 
several seriously drug addicted individuals, who are supposed to inform police about planned 
heroin purchase. Not surprisingly, each of this 100-article witnesses is put into dependence 
on police officers. That is why the mere emergence of this practice leads to abuse of several 
principles of criminal justice at the same time. In fact, one scandalous criminal case took 
place in the northern Kazakhstan demonstrates clearly the horrible consequence and 
complexity of these undercover activities. 
In October 2015, classified witness on criminal case about drug distribution was hiding 
from police being terrified for his life. This man had told the journalist such outstanding 
secrets of investigation about which interested people would choose not talk. This time in the 
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courtroom was prosecuted Denis Yaroshenko for illicit drug trade in particularly great sizes. 
However, the prosecution was stacked since the main witness did come to the court (Kiselyev 
2015). In the criminal case this witness is signed up as some Kubeev. Usually these classified 
witnesses are covered from the public eye, their appearance remains unknown, the voice is 
changed, and real name is not allowed to be pronounced. However, that day the main witness 
has decided to break all this secrecy in order to protect the destiny of one illegally accused 
man (Kiselyev, 2015). 
“When I realized that Denis is going to be zagruzit’ po polnoi (criminal jargon - 
to exhibit a full criminal charge) I have decided not allow this to happen. He is 
prosecuted for podstava (criminal jargon - fabricated criminal case), since I was 
supposed to provoke him to commit this crime.” As he continued to uncover the 
dirty true about cover police operation, in the spring he was taken by police 
officers and interrogated in the car. Not surprisingly, they reminded him about his 
drug addiction and previous record of conviction. However, after that they 
offered him a cooperation. They told me: “You are a drug addict, and you walk 
on very shaky ground. So, anyway you will need our support one day, but you 
have to help us. I agreed, and had written at their dictation the statement that 
purportedly I was interested to help voluntarily and uncover the drug dealer. I did 
not know who is this drug dealer would be” (Kiselyev 2015). 
He was formalized as a secret agent and given a pseudonym. Then, few days later his 
first undercover operation begun. He was ordered to call Denis Yaroshenko and to ask him 
about heroin purchase. They knew each other since they were taking rehabilitation course at 
the same clinic.  In this manner, this newly created undercover agent had asked Yaroshenko 
for a meeting and then supplied with recording equipment he began his so-called undercover 
mission (Kiselyev 2015). “That time Yaroshenko told me that he didn’t know how to help 
me. I was insisting on my need. Drug addict will always understand another drug addict. 
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Narcotic shakes are horrible. So, he left his house and gave some drugs. I don’t know, may be 
had shared with me his own insufficient supplies” (Kiselyev 2015). What was interesting in 
this case, is that Yaroshenko was not arrested immediately. Kim had just delivered drugs to 
them and the mission was accomplished. His arrest took place way later. Why did that 
happen? It is still unclear. Search of his dwelling produced no traces of drugs. After that, Kim 
was suffering for a terrible remorse. When he was informed that Yaroshenko had been 
arrested and what would happen to him soon, he had decided that come what may, but he had 
to tell the truth to the court (Kiselyev 2015). However, he clearly understood how dangerous 
this act of protection could be. “I and really scared that after I had drop my mask they will 
revenge me. That is why on the last week I had sent a letter to the prosecution office. In this 
letter I had described this situation in details” (Kiselyev 2015). Later on, in order to increase 
the chances of his own safety and to prevent police from hiding this fake accusation, he had 
decided to contact the newspaper. So, today this man still doesn’t know when he will be able 
to appear at the court and tell the truth without any risks for him. At this stage the only one is 
clear, if he comes to police hands again, the price for his life will be negligible (Kiselyev 
2015).    
Several days later Yuri Kim’s lawyer had stated that the following court proceedings 
organization is impossible. However, the judge Asylbek Jumagulov had disagreed with him 
and insisted on personal attendance and independent testimony of Yuri Kim. “If everything 
what he said is true, then Yaroshenko will be proven to be innocent and involved police 
officers will become objects of criminal prosecution.” In other words, Kim became a visible 
threat to the ‘siloviki' (Kiselyev 2015). So what about them? Five of them were interrogated 
in the courtroom. As it follows from this interrogation, they tell the same story from the side 
of public prosecution. Simultaneously, it becomes evident that none of them had been present 
at the actual crime scene. So, they could not testify on the legality of committed investigative 
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activities. At that time, the prosecution office continued to evaluate letter send by Kim, as a 
result this latter has been transferred to the court (Kiselyev 2015).  
Few days later, Kim was able to come into the court. As he testified in the courtrooms, 
police officers came to him by themselves and asked to talk. “That time I was under 
investigation; that is why I had agreed to meet them. They were driving me somewhere for a 
long period of time, while asking me to help with their work. Also, they told me that they 
could detain me,” Kim said (Kiselyev 2015). I was scared, since I clearly remember how the 
heroin was dumped off to me in 2008. As a result I had spent three years in prison. He also 
stated that all investigation actions were taking place in some house outside of the city, while 
they were supposed to be organized in the official building of the police department 
according to the national legislation. Kim did not hold valid any of his signatures in that 
scandalous criminal case. Most probably, somebody had fabricated them. In the reference of 
the above mentioned circumstance, his lawyer Snezhana Kim had told that territory around 
the court building is constantly surfaced by police detectives (Kiselyev 2015). This raises 
serious concerns about life and safety of Yuri Kim. “I had asked the court to assure his 
personal security.” As it follow, the court had obliged the prosecution office to provide 
security. However, at that period of time it was unclear which agency was going to protect 
Kim either the KNB or the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (Kiselyev 2015).    
During data analysis I had found several huge scandals relevant to the institutional of 
such a quasi-democratic practice. As a result of this practice, one side fights crime, but the 
other leads to repression of people who are involved into these criminal cases. In fact, 
informant had no choice other than to share information, police officers have to implement 
this practice as a result of strong pressure of statistical requirements, and finally the drug 
seller possesses no more than 15 grams of heroin for sale.  
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Using Drugs for Fabricating Criminal Cases and for Receiving Illegal Income from Below 
Police subculture in Central Asia has quite a peculiar character. Engvall (2011) analyzes it in 
the cases of Kyrgyzstan as a pyramid structure where the greatest opportunities of extortion 
and corruption are allowed to high level police officers. He shows that in order to become a 
member of such an elite police significant amount of money had to be invested (Engvall 
2011). “In 2004, a ranking official in the Ministry of Internal Affairs commented on the 
dynamic at the top level of the system to international media: “If you want to become the 
deputy head of a district police department in the capital, it is enough to pay 10,000 dollars. 
And the post of deputy head of Bishkek’s internal affairs department costs 20,000 dollars.” 
Ranks are also up for sale” (Engvall 2011, 118). “The use of money does not mean that 
meritocratic criteria and formal procedures are eliminated. The right to purchase an office is 
embedded in formal meritocratic procedures, including educational achievements…The sale 
of offices, on the other hand, is surrounded by informal personal contacts. Put differently, a 
prospective official does not bring a bag of money to a particular ministry and inquire whom 
to pay in order to be employed” (Engvall 2011, 128).  
Obviously, the presence of similar practices would mean significantly more challenges 
as a result of pressure of vertical external factors that became more powerful during the 
recent years. So, there must have been emerged some informal agreement protecting bonds of 
loyalty among dishonest police. These informal agreements must have been protecting police 
officers for a period of time needed to develop these illicit practices. “Given the danger that 
hierarchies may depend on networks more than networks depend on hierarchies, sistema’s 
governance model preserves the weakness of the rule of law, so that the application of formal 
rules can be selective and allow manipulation of the balance between hierarchies and network 
resources” (Ledeneva 2013, 44). Ledeneva drawing on evidence from Russia had also 
stressed the importance of verbal agreement between police bosses and their subordinates. 
Following an oral command without proper written documentation of action, is perceived as 
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a sign of indisputable loyalty (Ledeneva 2013). That is why, even when the prosecution in 
Kostanay took place, only low and middle level were prosecuted despite names and positions 
of high level police officers have been mentioned during the trials: 
“Question from the public prosecutor Yergaliyev: Describe briefly others police officers, 
their nicknames. What amounts of money had been paid to them? 
Answer: 100 000 tenge – Anya Bol’shaya, 100 000 tenge – Anya Malen’kaya, 100 000 
tenge - Katya Bol’shaya, 80 000 tenge –Kosolapyi, 80 000 –100 000 Inzhiner, 50 000 
tenge –Pechenka. 
Question: Which administrative positions did they hold? 
Answer: As I know, Anya Malen’kaya it is Aslan, their boss, who is Boss of Kuanysh 
from city police department. I was giving money through them, when they demanded. 
It was their condition. I had no idea, who is Anya Bolshaya, but I suggest that it was 
Abay from DVD. Among us we supposed that it were them. I was also transferring 
money for Kosolapyi through Asylbayeva and Petrenko. I don’t know what his duty 
position is.  Petrenko just called me that there is a police officer who is employed in 
Knizhka (nickname of the Oblast MVD headquarters). Later he called me and ask, 
whether I was buying heroin from her. I confirmed and told him that I will transfer him 
money through her.  So, was sending him 80 000 tenge every time. As for Pechenka, I 
knew him personally, but I was obliged to him money through Rezida, it was his 
condition. The same was with others, but I don’t know who Katya is. Later on, I had 
realized that most probably it was Kuanysh Kabyldin from city police department.  
Question: So, you paid to higher police authorities through Rezida? 
Answer:  Yes, through her. But money for Kosolapyi were sent through Alevtina 
Petrenko. 
Question: Who is “Kosolapyi”? 
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Answer: He worked in knizhka, in DVD, I mean. He was a head of some department. 
As I understood it was Department against Organized Crime. I was not introduced to 
him. So, I can be mistaken. However, by their request, I was sending money to him 
each month” (Criminal case number 1-1/2014, 606). 
The rules of this system are quite straightforward: “There are no exit terms and 
conditions: at the stage of recruitment to system, people are meant to remain loyal for life, 
dependent on handouts from systems and satisfied with systems’s status games (Ledeneva 
2013, 112). So, this agreement had been fulfilled by the middle level police officers. In the 
absence of testimonies from them clearly showing who was participating and organizing drug 
gang covering among police elites, the ability of prosecution office and the KNB were 
bounded by recent attempt to democratize legal system and organize criminal processes in 
accordance with a principle of legality.   
 This tolerance of the street-level police corruption in exchange for meeting statistical 
quotas and gaining income from below provides support for Hypothesis 2. My research 
revealed the following patterns of this vertical internal incentive: police chiefs routinely 
request or demand cash from police subordinates and protect drug dealers and drug 
distributors – all in order to guarantee continuous cash inflows. Moreover, as the court 
records indicate, the oblast-level police chiefs do not figure as the accused by being protected 
by their own higher-ups. The quote below belongs to the small-scale drug dealer who 
testified in the Kostanay court: “I just know that Anya Malen’kaya is a Boss of Kuanysh… 
We did not pay to high-ranking in person. Rezida did it by herself” (Criminal case number 1-
1/2014, 503). Such a specification in the payments was organized by criminals, but it is still 
unclear who had developed it. So, this may lead to the argument that bribes of 100 000 tenge 
and more were given to various heads of departments. Furthermore, witness Orazova testified 
in that case: “I do observe only low-ranking officers. There are no high officers, since I 
also know all of them. They used to talk me to go to the runners, since they were providing 
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me with heroin” (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). These quotes made by the drug dealers in 
the court proceedings clearly showed the protective mechanisms of the high-ranking police. 
Moreover, the higher the status of drug dealer testifying in the courtroom was, the better they 
were able to explain the corrupt schemes and mechanisms, as the Kostanay court hearing 
record shows:  
“Question:  You told, that Csoi was pad 40 000 tenge each month, while 
Mukhamedzhanov was given 100 000? What had conditioned this difference? 
Answer: I don’t know why. Later on, I realized that if the person calls and ask 6000-7000 
tenge, the may be these big amounts of money were not for him, but his boss. If had 
received 100 000 tenge, what would be a reason to ask 6000 tenge later? 
Question from the Judge:  You told, that you were giving 100 000 tenge. Through whom 
have you been sending this money to high police authorities? 
Answer: Through Asylbayeva and Petrenko. I didn’t know them personally since it was 
their demand” (Criminal case number 1-1/2014, 608). 
 It has been described in the indictment statement that lower level police officers were 
asking for money even for their bosses’ weddings. Not surprisingly, drug dealers were 
sending amounts of money exceeding 100,000 tenge (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). 
Naturally, “Police officers were receiving monthly payments on return for protection, closing 
their eyes, relieving of the runners, providing information about planned operations etc. The 
payment had regular character. For example, every 15th of each month “Engineer” was 
paid nearly 150 000 - 200 000 tenge. I know that there were more important people. For 
example, when “Daddy” was calling, even Rezida was terrified. She took Petrenko and they 
began talking with him behind closed doors” (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). All these 
quotes clearly indicate a close working relationship between drug wholesalers and police 
chiefs, a constant and routine flow of cash from drug wholesalers to police chiefs, and the 
impunity of the latter from criminal prosecution.  
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The structure and culture of the law enforcement agencies “have an important impact 
on their ability and willingness to pursue certain types of criminal cases. Agents are 
socialized into a strict, militaristic hierarchy, in which subordination to the chain command 
trumps all other considerations, thereby limiting officers’ ability to be creative and take 
initiative” (McCarthy, 2015, 95). This argument made McCarthy in the Russian context fully 
applies to Kazakhstani law enforcement agencies. Given that Russian, Kazakhstani and most 
of other post-Soviet law enforcement agencies do not carry dramatically from each other, this 
argument finds an empirical support in the forensic examination of phone conversations 
results of which have been revealed during the trial court proceedings in Kostanay. For 
example, in the conversation of the 10th of June 2012, at 13.24 Asylbayeva was asking to 
Petrenko to “contribute 100 000 tenge to the police employee called Katya” (Criminal case 
number 1-1/2014). In another phone conversation on 25 June 2012, at 18:26 between 
Chebunina and Almagambetov, he told her that he had negotiated with other colleagues that 
they would not interrupt their drug dealing anymore. In return, police officer demanded 
inconsiderable amount of money as usual. That was their manner to ask for so-called help. 
Chebunina had answered him that it was not appropriate manner to ask for help and also 
insisted that she would inform their bosses about this incident. In the end, money were 
transferred, but criminals had warned non-local police officers that in case they will repeat 
their actions their leader (Asylbayeva) will contact higher authorities (Criminal case number 
1-1/2014). On 27 June, 2012 at 15:53, during the phone conversation between 
Almagambetov and Chebunina, the latter was informed that her runners were captured by 
unknowns and that they demand her to come to the distant Mall. He had also asked her 
whether she had called Aslan, Kuanysh and Murat (presumably high authorities in the police 
department). She replied that she had called to all numbers left by Asylbayeva in case of very 
emergent situation will take place (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). He had stressed again 
that she should contact Aslan, explicitly stating that: “Aslan, who is our chief”. He had 
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recommended her to immediately contact Rezida and not to come to this place (Criminal case 
number 1-1/2014).  
In this case, I can trace that in relatively challenging situation there was a need to 
contact higher authorities. These authorities had covered mobile phone numbers available for 
criminals only in a very dangerous situations. I can make an additional conclusion that only 
high-level criminals leaders came to the crime scene only after the contact with high police 
authorities. So, the principle of relative subordination and equality can be implemented to 
characterize the culture of existing relationship within this organized crime group. For 
example, Chadow, had claimed that on the 27 of June he was captured by unknown police 
officers at their normal drug-selling place.  
“During the drive they had told me to call my boss. They demanded her to come 
immediately, otherwise they threatened her that I will go to prison. Later on, she 
called back and replied that she can’t come. Then, they told me to call my police 
officers and ask them to come and release me. At that point I had realized that they 
want money for my release. I had called Almagambetov, he came immediately, took 
me and begun talking to them. When he came back he told me that they want 25 000 
tenge and that they were high authorities from the Oblast Department and the KNB. 
He had also highlighted that we must stop trade that today. This accident was very 
strange. He told that it was like a framing a fabricated case against him” (Criminal 
case number 1-1/2014). 
Few days later Almagambetov had a conflict with Chebunina, which did not delivered money 
in time. He told her that his bosses gave an order (komanda) to collect money and he as his 
subordinate had to obey it. Their chef was angry, since everyone else had already brought 
money (skinulis - to collect money, terminology of criminal jargon) and he needed to go on 
vacation. So, he urged them, if the boss would give an order to catch them, they should not be 
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angry on them. Chebunina replied to him that she had contacted Asylbayeva several times 
already. But Asylbayeva was going to contact their boss personally as a drug gang’s leader 
(Criminal case number 1-1/2014). 
As it should be clear by now, drug dealers provided police officials with almost 
everything they needed. In fact, Seredenkova provided Gizazulin with cash, when the former 
demanded money to buy foodstuff for the head of city police station. He had stated that they 
collectively collected money for a very important boss. So, she had sent runner with money 
for him (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). 
Court testimonies of drug dealers show that there were no high-ranking officers 
among prosecuted police officers. They also show that police bosses were receiving more 
significant bribes compared to the middle-level police officers. Also, drug dealers preferred 
to solve more serious and risky situations with the involvement of police chiefs.  Interview 
data also confirmed that every month police bosses had demanded a specified amount of cash 
from nearly every subordinate. If police officer disagrees to bring money, the reasons to fire 
him were found easily. Being captured by systemic rules of loyalty to bosses, the need to 
extort money in order to become promoted, a strong pressure to fulfill statistical requirements 
and many other incentives, turned an ordinary police officer into the corrupt one. 
In short, formal statistical requirements discourage police to focus on hard and complex 
drug-trafficking cases, while informal demands from police chiefs strongly encourage 
cooperation with drug dealers. This structure of incentives discourages police from 
organizing cover operations to infiltrate drug gangs since they are long-term and risky 
operations which may be effectively sabotaged by corrupt police supervisors and result in 
unsolved crimes, thus, hurting both formal career prospects and their reputation within the 
police ranks. Moreover, if all illicit commands of superiors are be given in oral form, then 
middle level police has no alternative other than obeying in order to prove his/her loyalty. 
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Otherwise, the suspicion in non-participation will lead to the considerable informal 
punishments and dangers.  
How do police officers learn about these incentives? In order to become police officers 
many applicants choose to apply to specialized Police Academies situated in several 
Kazakhstani regions. As a result of semi-structured interview many police officers among my 
respondents had graduated from these specialized schools. So, I had an opportunity to trace 
where tolerance towards corruption, krugovaya poruka and selective enforcement are 
developing. Probably this tolerance is established before becoming attested police officer and 
existing practices force new police officers to adapt to these rules. In this regard, one KNB 
officer told me in the interview that: 
“They are admitted into the police academy already fully prepared to these informal 
rules. In fact, admission, evaluation, education and even career promotion depends 
on money. As a result, we receive an uncompetitive police officers, who need to 
bribe his bosses in order to stay on his position. In this hierarchy, superiors are not 
interested in the nature of these money. Inevitably, they have no choice rather than 
to pay for their professional incompetence. So, that is why we do observe corrupt 
practices, lost forensics and other shameful things.” (Respondent 18, October 2015) 
This claim had been made at the initial stage and had changed all future interviews. So, 
I had decided to ask my respondents from the police about admissions process into Police 
Academies. Many of them avoided answering this question, others begun talking that they 
were accepted fairly, according to rules specified in the relevant law. However, today 
acceptance became a mess (“bardak”). For example, one interviewed police officer admitted: 
“In order to be accepted into Police Academy graduate school you have to pay 5000 US 
dollars. Otherwise, no previous merits and years of experience are useful. They basically 
don’t care how good you are as a police officer. All you need is money or very strong 
personal connections in the admissions committee….You know, promotion is always 
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complicated. If you graduate from this school most probably and very soon you will be 
provided with leading position and you will spend two years without this routine 
pressure… You don’t have to pay tuition fee, your salary remains the same and years in 
grade are still accumulating… So, it is quite a good bargain… The problem is that honest 
ones do not have such money…As a result most corrupted officers become most educated 
and promoted ones…”(Interview 11, November, 2015). 
There were even more shocking evidence was collected during internship in the anti-
drug trafficking department. As it follows from my interview: 
“Respondent 18: When we were graduating we heard that there were some 
corrupted actives somewhere. We were terrified to ask something inappropriate or 
give something to high command. However, today newly recruited and trained youth 
is completely different. Do you know that they pass professional and physical 
examination at the Departmental building, which is here? It was implemented in 
order to lessen the probability of corruption… Stupidity…If they want to give, they 
will find whom they can give… So, once I was outside my office. That day new 
recruits were passing exams, and I heard the conversation between of them. Most 
shocking was phrase ‘Interesting, when I will be able to extort my money back… So, 
they give bribes to receive a position and then bring invested money back from 
bribes. You are very naïve’.” (Interview 20, January, 2016). 
In short, evidence contained in this chapter clearly supports all three hypotheses that Soviet 
legacies and post-Soviet bureaucratic incentives provide fertile ground for police corruption 
and quick personal enrichment through collusion with drug dealers. 
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Chapter 3  External Incentives from Government Agencies, NGOs and the 
Mass Media May Discourage Police Corruption 
 
The preceding chapter paints a gloomy picture of deeply rooted and widespread police 
corruption fueled by the growing illegal drug trade. However, as many interview respondents 
had stated, both massive public outcry (horizontal external incentive) and the latest anti-
corruption campaign (vertical external incentive) make this perverse policing practice less 
widespread. For a better understanding of externally imposed constraints on police behavior, 
an exploration of practices of other Kazakhstani law enforcement agencies such as General 
Procuracy (GP) and the Committee of National Security (KNB) is necessary because it helps 
illuminate horizontal external signals and threats faced by corrupt police. Importantly, I argue 
that these two agencies have somewhat different incentives and practices than the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs (MVD) has. But even if we assume that they are as corrupt as MVD or that it 
is difficult to distinguish an honest law-enforcer from the corrupt one, the nature of inter-
agency rivalries pushes both agencies to detect and prosecute police corruption via legal 
procedures. This assertion is in line with the growing comparative research on the functions 
of law in monitoring and enforcing bureaucratic discipline in authoritarian regimes (Ginsburg 
and Moustafa 2008).  
Most recent official records were requiring oblation police departments to increase 
effectiveness in the fight against illicit drug trade. However, there were numerous statements 
and criticism made by the General Procuracy that the routine work of the MVD should 
abandon a very strong dependence on the statistical evaluation. This all reminds me an 
ancient Persian proverb: the dogs bark, but the caravans move on.  
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General Procuracy: Overseeing Criminal Prosecutions of Corrupt Police 
According to the Law on the Prosecutor’s office of the Republic of Kazakhstan, it is the 
central law enforcement agency accountable to the President of Republic Kazakhstan. This 
agency supervises exact and uniform application of laws and other standard legal acts in 
Kazakhstan. It also supervises the legality of operative-search activity, inquiry, and criminal 
investigation, and has the powers to eliminate any infringements of legality and carry out 
criminal prosecution (Law on the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1995, 
arts. 1 and 4).  
 Official powers of prosecutors are massive. For example, “in case of default in 
instructions of the prosecutor, he has the right to take out the decision about compulsory 
execution of requirements of the prosecutor… and to send this for execution to the higher 
state authorities. These authorized state authorities are obliged immediately take measures to 
execute it.” Meanwhile, it is worth mentioning that the actions of prosecutor can be appealed 
against him with reference to the higher authority of the prosecution. However, the appeal of 
requirements does not stop its execution (Law on the Prosecutor’s office of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, 1995, art. 26-1).  
With regard to the drug related and any other type of crime, the procurators are allowed 
to enter any premises, to receive data on financial operations and accounts, demand any 
actions from organizations conducting operative-search activities and evaluate their results. 
They also have a power to receive necessary documents, materials, statistics and other data 
(Law on the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1995). They conduct check-
ups of employees from other law enforcement authorities. They can appoint examinations 
and carry out other verifications. In order to perform their tasks and exercise these rights they 
bring protests, give instructions for infringements of rights elimination; take out decisions 
about excitation of criminal case, disciplinary  or administrative offenses. More importantly, 
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they can cancel or remove the measures of forbidding or restrictive character imposed by 
other state agencies in order address them in court for national interest protection (Law on the 
Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1995, art. 29) 
Powers of the prosecutor (attorney) on assurance (supporting) of legality of inquiry and 
a preliminary investigation include a very wide range of legal opportunities. Not surprisingly, 
their power is incomparable to other agencies. While carrying out supervision the legality of 
inquiry and investigation, the prosecutor (attorney) receives criminal cases, documents, 
materials and other data on committed crimes, a direction of operatively-search activity, 
inquiry and preliminary investigation (Law on the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan,  1995). So, they could check the law abidance of authorities that directly 
implying inquiry and preliminary investigation. When the illicit accusation takes place, the 
procurator is obliged to cancel illegal decisions of inspectors. Moreover, if infringements of 
the citizens’ rights or illegal methods of investigation have been admitted, he raises a 
question on the responsibility of guilty persons. Besides that, when illicit actions had been 
established during the investigation and inquiries, then the procurator returns criminal case on 
additional investigation or stops it in full volume (Law on the Prosecutor’s Office of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, 1995). Procurator is supposed to check legality at reception, 
registration, the permission of statements about committed or preparing crimes. He must also 
support or refuse in the petition of criminal prosecution for arrest and holding in custody of 
the suspect. They can raise criminal cases by themselves and give written instructions on 
procedure of investigation of crimes. Besides that they can demand police bosses to check out 
their subordinates and organize full disclosure of crime. Instructions of the prosecutor are 
given in written form and are obligatory for the person making inquiry and preliminary 
investigation (Law on the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1995, art. 38).  
 The legal protection of employees of authorities of the Prosecutor’s office also matters. 
For example, encroachment for a life or threat of violence to the prosecutor related to his 
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office activity and any other actions interfering performance of the prosecutor in its official 
duties will lead to the legal responsibility. Besides that, any check on the fact of the legal 
offense made by the prosecutor, is carried out with participation of representatives of 
authorities of the Prosecutor’s office. While prosecutor is on duty no administrative 
detention, personal inspection of, examination of its things and transport used by him is 
possible (Law on the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1995, art. 50).  
Numerous legal norms and documents would suggest that the prosecution office can 
become a safe haven from corruption of different law enforcement agencies. However, the 
reality of Post-Soviet states had taught us to double check the actual performance of any legal 
document, especially if the document allows someone to use political and legal power. Many 
respondents had stressed that formal legal documents can be reinterpreted easily just to reach 
personal or organizational goals. The same situation is here. In this regard, several 
respondents had been strongly criticizing the widening authority of procurator office. In fact, 
one MVD detective told me in the interview that: 
“Respondent 23: You know, they used to work on materials collected by us. So, 
they hardly ever informed with a real fight against crime. That is why they are 
constantly criticizing us. It is very easy to criticize us while not being realizing what 
it means to find, catch and interrogate a criminal. All these statements about our 
ineffectiveness and the need for democratization are widely proclaimed by them. In 
reality, drug dealers are not candy shop sellers. They do have high qualified lawyers 
and protectors from many law enforcements agencies. They informed with criminal 
legislation even better than young detectives. It does not mean that the younger 
generation is stupid, it just means that each police officers has its own purpose… 
Me: How so? The same document regulates all criminal procedures and 
investigation procedures. I mean, Criminal Procedural Code… 
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Respondent 23: (laughing)… These codes…. Well, there is a difference between 
detective and investigator. Detective is focused on collection of information. He is 
like a spy, he have to maintain report with criminals sometimes. They collect 
information and establish connection between suspects etc.…As for investigators, 
they are basically preparing all documents in an appropriate manner. This is also 
very important task. It is like an art. Sometimes absence or presence of relevant 
paragraph or a signature changes the decision to be made by judge.  
Me: Do procurators realize this difference? 
Respondent 23: Theoretically yes, they claim that that they do. In reality, new 
Criminal Code and Criminal Procedural Codes were drafted by them and after we 
begun working on the ground nearly everyone in the Ministry began suspecting that 
these codes were created to please criminals. They were given widening 
opportunities and rights, while we were deprived ours. Can you imagine, ordinary 
police officers is terrified now to be prosecuted for corruption or abuse of power 
even more than the drug dealer to be captured into the prison? Is that a normal thing 
for your foreigners?  
Me: Democratization process may take some time. All of this done to make us 
more law abiding and increase public trust. 
Respondent 23: No, how can people trust us when they publish any type of 
violation made by police officer? Have you ever heard about any prosecution of 
procurator abusing power? 
Me: … (silence)…. 
Respondent 23: Well, I will tell you the story then… Once the whole anti-drug 
department was working on the gypsy clan distributing and trafficking drugs, the 
case promised to be very resonant. We had spent nearly year to find evidence and 
establish the fact of their illicit actives. Several departments were involved - us, guys 
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from organized crime department and many others from different agencies. And you 
know what happened after we submitted the file to procurators? One of them begun 
criticizing each single letter of it, each single signature in the materials. He was 
postponing this case for years. Every time with different excuses. Finally, the case 
was annulled because terms of investigation had inspired. But, everything looks 
perfectly legal. They have unprofessional police officers to blame, while procurator 
looks as a highly moral and legal abiding officer following democratization politics. 
We just agreed with that, since new crimes were committed, new dealers appeared, 
we can’t fight for a one single case, while hundreds more are committed. It becomes 
normal to listen their criticism. Whatever is wrong, police is to be blamed. Later on 
we were informed from our informant from this gypsy clan. This highly qualified 
procurator was given money in order to protect their interest. So, the picture is 
simple, if they can’t bribe us, they will go higher. Correspondingly, prices are 
higher, but it’s not the point. The point is that all their propaganda about the rule of 
law worth nothing.  
Me: But the presence of one corrupted procurator doesn’t mean that the whole 
office acts like that… or? 
Respondent 23: As I said that they are trying to maintain nice public image. Even 
these games with new Codes. In reality, they failed to establish more effective 
legislation. They began all this because elites demanded a change. To please them 
they promptly copied the Code from other states and nothing from our practice was 
taken into consideration. These codes do not reflect our reality and no one is saying 
that… Moreover, how can they accept criticism after they had submitted drafts to 
President? “You know, Mr., President we had worsened the situation with these new 
draft Codes. We were not able to create a reliable piece of legislation. All our reports 
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were written in order to accumulate as much authority as possible.” That would be 
unimaginable for them, but that is what nation in fact needs.” (Respondent 23, 
January 2016)     
Such a bold statement deserved a particular attention and a check through triangulation 
of evidence if possible. So, during all following interview I was asking lawyers, detectives, 
investigators on the potential capabilities of prosecutors. These answers varied, but in most of 
them the major criticism was directed against growing influence of prosecution office. As it 
follows from the interview conducted in order to organize data triangulation: 
“Respondent 17 (lawyer): As my professional experience tells me, the prosecution 
office knows nothing about adversary nature of the judicial process. They basically 
accumulating more power year by year. They had ‘podmyali pod sebya’ (take over 
themselves) courts and preliminary investigation. They dictate their own rules of judicial 
processes each stage. So, no one is interested to act against them. Even for judge 
challenging the procurator will mean a significant career problems.  
Me: Was it always the same? 
Respondent 17 (lawyer): no, when I was a judge, we had some independency… 
Respect… Judicial robe meant something important. Then, it begun changing gradually. 
Today it is becoming messy. You know, during my last years as a judge I constantly kept 
noticing that judges became afraid for their offices. There was established some kind of 
practice making judges not only accountable, but also bounded by their decision. They 
can’t chose the punishment by simply referring to certain legal acts and personal values, as 
it is supposed to be by legislation. In reality, if the sentence made by judge will be 
challenged, then there is a big risk to come. If the sentence given by you will be fewer 
than the judicial commission decides, you will receive admonition. If the number of these 
admonitions reaches five, the judge will be discharged for professional inaptitude. So, they 
are trying to give as severe sentences as possible. Is not it a sign of growing influence of 
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the prosecution? The longer period of time is sentenced, the better job was done by the 
prosecutors. Ironic, doesn’t it?  
Me: It looks like hypocrisy. On the one hand, they demand severe 
punishment. On the other, they proclaim democratization? 
Respondent 17 (lawyer): Democratization? By procurators? (laughing). 
They are always pretending to establish the rule of law…. You know, that 
scandalous criminal case about police corruption? Initially, when the court 
proceedings were organized, our clients were telling names, positions at various 
stages of judicial process. They wanted to lessen their punishment in return for 
information that was needed by prosecution, if they ever were interested in the rule 
of law and fight against corruption. These names were written nowhere. Nobody 
opened criminal cases, while having tremendous legal opportunities. Surprising fact, 
isn’t it? Besides that, all real job is done by the bodies of preliminary investigation, 
while the prosecution is doing literally nothing, except ‘tychet paltsem’ (perk their 
finger into) professional incapacity of others. If anything, they want prestige. 
Everything else like justice, rule of law, accountability. I strongly doubt, they ever 
were interested in them. Put it simply, what is lacking is not new legislation, but 
rather an understanding of public responsibility. Their colleagues usually confuse 
organizational and legal authority with their personal one.  
Me: So, it is not about organizational politics? 
Respondent 17 (lawyer): I don’t even know… I used to think that these 
were young and too ambitious young unexperienced procurators to be blamed. In 
fact, it is always about an individual implementing the rules established by 
organization. They can close their eyes or set unrealistic goals for a preliminary 
investigation body…” (Respondent 8, November, 2015).    
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Consequently, there is a growing feeling, that law enforcement system was taken away 
its normal practices and not given democratic ones. One particular agency begun 
accumulation unprecedented amount of power. In fact, larger political reasons had 
conditioned this outcome. President Nazarbayev met with the heads of the Committee of 
National Security, MVD, financial police, the customs service, and the General Procuracy. 
This interdepartmental meeting had revealed numerous confrontations between different law 
enforcement agencies. As many journalists had mentioned, strong criticism of the General 
Procurator had discredited the reputation and official reputation of several police generals. In 
his criticism he had stated that other agencies do nothing, while the General Procuracy 
operated flawlessly. President Nazarbayev agreed with this criticism and warned law 
enforcement chiefs that potential responsibility for disobedience is about to come (Ak Orda, 
2013). 
 
The Committee of National Security: Catching Corrupt Police 
“The National Security Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan is a special state 
body, which is under their jurisdictional authority securing human and society, constitutional 
system, state sovereignty, territorial integrity, economical and scientific-technical and 
defense potential of the country.” (KNB, 2015)  The fight against corruption and illicit drug 
trade is also a significant part of their activities. Naturally, participation in the law 
enforcement system KNB by being an heir of KGB creates an image of secret police service 
with extremely wide opportunities and treating leaders’ order higher than legal norms. 
Therefore, everyone would suspect the exploitation of their unprecedentedly wide 
opportunities and quite a political reputation for their own benefit. In reality, the opposite 
turned out to be true at least in the sphere of illicit drug trade. In contrast to police, many 
official documents from General Procuracy, MVD, and journalistic reports were showing 
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facts representing the effectiveness of this agency. In fact, it is incomparable to others. One 
of my respondents during my interview had shared a quite interesting and challenging idea 
about the roots of illicit drug trade in Kazakhstan: 
“It’s corruption. And it is not as simple as it seems. The MVD is only part of the 
problem, but in reality there is a more complicated structure. To simplify, drugs are 
somehow crossing Kazakhstani border. So, it is not only those who extort money 
from drug dealers are responsible, but also those who allow drugs to come into our 
country. Obviously, the beginning of the problem is border guard troops” 
(Respondent 31, January 2016). 
Even if that is so and border guard troops can potentially allow heroin to pass the border, 
their overall performance is impressive. According to the mass media reports and press 
releases made by the KNB, the amount of drugs seized and destroyed by agency is fantastic.  
In 2006, along the line of the fight against corruption were initiated and investigated 
criminal cases against state officials, including many law enforcement officials.  Among 
investigated criminal cases of corruption were handed down 63 convictions against 73 
officials (1/3 are MVD employees). As far as the illicit drug trade is concerned, KNB had 
liquidated 23 drug channels and 10 drug groups, identified 250 drug-related crimes, 
confiscated about 3.2 tons of narcotics and psychotropic substances, including over 875 kg of 
opium and heroin (62% of heroin and 92% of opium seized in the country that year) (The 
Committee of National Security, 2007 ).  
These fantastic figures show quite an effective performance. However, in autocratic 
states mass media reports can be biased. So, if these fantastic figures to be true, they had to 
be replicated every year. In 2012, KNB stopped 63 international drug channels and 24 drug 
groups and confiscated the total of 290.5 kg of heroin and 4.09 tons of other drugs valued at 
1.9 billion tenge (The Committee of National Security, 2012). 
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In 2013, the Almaty KNB department had caught 7 international drug trafficking 
channels and intercepted 14 facts of illicit drug turnover, which resulted in 30 criminal cases 
against 16 persons caught with 408 kg of drugs. On December 12, 2013, the KNB officers 
has once again destroyed 220 kg of heroin confiscated from illegal turnover in Almaty. This 
portion of drugs had included 405 kg of heroin and 3 kg of amphetamine (the Committee of 
National Security, 2014). Besides that, in 2015, the Astana KNB department seized and 
destroyed more than 390 kg of drugs in total, initiated 25 criminal cases against 10 persons 
for distributing drugs on a large scale, and had them convicted (Mikoyan, 2015). 
On the organizational level the effectiveness of their activities is represented by strict 
figures, while on the individual level the situation looks different. In the audio transcripts of 
court proceedings against scandalous Kostanay police officers, there was a case 
characterizing the difference between the KNB and the MVD officials. Even if a solitary case 
does not give us the right to generalize, due to the closeness we should represent the 
following example as well.   
Within the framework of the criminal case on September 17, 2012 during the search for 
the place of residence in the house of the drug lord Osennikova, whose nickname was 
Marzhanikha, after the discovery and seizure of narcotic drug - heroin on a large scale with a 
total weight 1002 grams, Osennikova tried to give a bribe to the deputy chief of department 
of the Kostanay KNB and the chief of the department of the Kostanay KNB. She had offered 
a bribe in the form of cash in the amount of 30,000 US dollars. Namely, for the release of her 
and her partner-in-crime Petrenko from criminal prosecution for the illegal acquisition, 
storage and transportation with intent to sell drug on a large scale (Criminal case number 1-
1/2014). 
During the search Osennikova appealed to the KNB officers and offered a bribe to 
release her and Petrenko. The offer came from her, she had specified the amount. So, they 
only recorded what she had said. They asked her, whether she understood that she acted 
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against the law. Yet she continued to insist. The KNB officer reported to the leadership and 
decided to imitate criminal behavior, trying to provoke her to bribe them. Therefore, he did 
not immediately refuse, but took a waiting position, giving the whole initiative to 
Osennikova. He was reporting this situation to his superiors by phone (Criminal case number 
1-1/2014).  
He had immediately received the approval for documenting these criminal acts and 
wrote a report. After Osennikova offered a bribe of about 30,000 dollars, all negotiations 
between Osennikova and the KNB officer were documented on tape (Criminal case number 
1-1/2014). Then, Petrenko’s daughter brought the money, spoke to Osennikova and went into 
the knitting room, there was the KNB officer, he announced that there would be a crime 
scene examination. In the presence of the whole group they started, all the money was 
counted, have been twenty-eight thousand eight hundred dollars to something. Everything 
was recorded on audio and used against both drug lords (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). 
On the other hand, two MVD respondents offered the following criticism of KNB:  
“Of course, they are also participate (‘varyatsya’) in all these illicit activities. I had 
many situations when I had prepared documents and led the investigation, but was 
forced to release a criminal. I was called and asked to leave him. I did that. It is quite 
risky to challenge them. They do collect compromising data (‘kopayut’) on 
everyone, there is no guarantee that they won’t begin collection on you. Now, all 
law enforcement service is the same. None of us, of them deserves trust today” 
(Respondent 2, August 2015). 
Several police officers stated in their interviews with me that ineffectiveness in the 
fight of the illicit drug trade was the outcome of the failure of Border Guard Troops, who are 
part of KNB: “Somehow illicit drugs cross the border. Do you really believe that it is possible 
without cooperation with officials?” (Respondent 17, January 2015). Similarly, it has been 
stated that: “In fact, after special scanners had been installed on the Russian border incredibly 
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high amount of heroin had been captured. But this is only for Russian border. Do you 
understand what I mean? In order to come to the Russian border Afghan heroin had to cross 
Southern border. Their officials are constantly criticized in many official reports. In response, 
they usually state that the border is overloaded. They state that they are fiscally unable to 
check each particular car crossing the border. It doesn’t mean that they are corrupted, but 
rather that they are neglectfully serve their duty. I don’t even know what is worse” 
(Respondent 11, October 2015). 
In this sense, it looks like there is no entirely corrupted agency, neither no entirely 
honest agency. As in every organization there are institutional politics and individuals 
implementing them. So, the effectiveness of this institution depends on the type of 
individuals selected to serve criminal justice. Their individual values influence their job 
performance and as a result effectiveness of the whole agency. So, this selection procedure 
would be better explained after analysis of external factors conditioning shameful 
performance of the MVD. 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations: Exposing and Shaming Corrupt Police 
There is also a growing influence of non-governmental organizations in the fight 
against illicit police activities in Kazakhstan. Their influence had been characterized as an 
external horizontal incentive as a result of their ability to expose the issues of human rights 
abuse and fabricated criminal cases made by police officers. In previous years their activities 
begun exposure of dishonest police behavior in mass media reports and in complaints to the 
higher levels of government. Human rights NGOs also criticize the low quality of criminal 
investigation of drug related crimes by Kazakhstani police. As it follows, the Chair of non-
governmental organization PRI and Chair of Organization monitoring respect of prisoners’ 
rights in the penal institutions Svetlana Kovlyagina argued that:  
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‘in the drug-related criminal cases evidence proving guilt is usually absent. 
During arrest the attesting witness usually covered behind the corner, cannot see 
anything and as a result cannot confirm anything. In fact, while a suspect is under 
the stage where data about criminal activities is collected, they are not able to find 
out where he purchases and stores drugs (Voronko, 2014). So, these imitators of 
crime is only one trump card available to the investigation body. However, who 
are these imitators? As investigation argues, these highly moral people, usually 
decide to demonstrate their civil responsibility. In reality, this type of criminal 
cases usually initiated with the help of people who under investigation 
themselves. One such a civil activist on average is involved in 10-15 similar 
criminal cases about voluntary disclosure of drug dealers. They regularly change 
their pseudonyms, national legislation allows them doing that (Voronko, 2014). 
Their real names are classified. But why is the police doing that? The main reason 
is that this so-called “civil active” imitator is usually an individual with criminal 
conviction or recently released one. So, he is fully dependent on men in uniform. 
Moreover, some of them are trading these drugs and between their main criminal 
activities and they cooperate with police” (Voronko, 2014). 
This statement shows that non-governmental organizations are well informed and prepared 
actors in the national law enforcement system. However, their effectiveness is still 
questionable. As any new institution their development will take some time before they will 
be able to provide community with something more than mass media releases.    
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Chapter 4  From Incentives to Actual Behavior: Categorization of Police 
Corruption in Kostanay 
 
 
As previous chapter made clear, police faces a set of contradictory incentives when facing 
drug dealers. Yet facing these incentives does not necessarily mean that police officers will 
act upon these incentives. For example, police could do nothing: not to fake criminal 
statistics, not to accept bribes and drugs from the drug dealers, and not to give bribes to 
supervisors. However, evidence clearly shows that police did act on these incentives. Let’s 
begin by analyzing crime statistics based on the official reports of the Kostanay Oblast’ 
Police Department in the past six years (see Table 1 below), the period, in which the 
Kostanay police had experienced a scandalous and shameful prosecution of dishonest police 
officers, as described at the beginning of my thesis. Most surprisingly, the official data 
supports my argument about faking criminal statistics in the drug-related crimes.  
Table 1 Activities of the Kostanay Oblast’ Anti-drug Department, 2010-2015 
Year All crimes Distribution of drugs Amount of heroin 
seized, grams 
2010 717 300 554.9 
2011 411 299 939.591 
2012 362 217 2763 
2013 318 179 3342 
2014 306 174 2557.7 
2015 320 188 2217.2 
 
Source: General Procuracy  
Note: New Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code entered in force on January 1, 2015. 
 
 
Table 1 clearly shows that, according to official figures, when this police mafia had 
operated in Kostanay, it solved many more drug-related crimes.  Yet, following the 
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prosecution of police mafia, the lower amount of destroyed drugs and solved drug-related 
crimes means that police actually begun operate in a real manner without attempts to 
misrepresent crime statistics in order to obtain better public image. This means that police did 
act on the external horizontal incentives – being afraid of criminal prosecution by the 
Committee of National Security and public shaming by the mass media and non-
governmental organizations.  
The nationwide statistics on drug-related crimes represent a clear pattern that nearly 
half of the initiated cases in drug-related crimes do not reach courtroom (see Table 2). The 
informal practices, which possibly condition such an inefficient and shameful outcome, will 
be explored below using the examples from the police drug mafia in Kostanay. Besides that,  
Table 2 Crimes of the Illicit Distribution, Storage and Transportation of the Illicit Drug 
Substances in Kazakhstan, 2010-2015 
Year All initiated criminal cases Criminal cases sent to court 
2010 9343 5839 
2011 4744 3525 
2012 4066 2947 
2013 4032 1704 
2014 3909 1811 
2015 6899 5268 
 
Source: General Procuracy  
Note: New Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code entered in force on January 1, 2015. 
 
in these examples I specify amounts of money that were taken as bribes from drug dealers. 
These figures will be given in order to compare them with the official salaries of police 
officers (see Table 3). This is necessary to show the attractiveness of the horizontal external 
incentives supplied by the drug dealers and the pressure from the vertical internal incentives 
supplied by the police chiefs expecting income from their subordinates.  The existence of 
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police mafia must have had influenced the functionality of the anti-drug department, even if 
its influence is unobservable for quantitative analysis. What type of practices and strategies 
does this mafia engage in Kostanay? Based on the analysis of my interview data, observation 
and court documents, it is clear that many more police officers acted on these incentives and 
engaged in various illegal activities, which I categorize below. The range of activities  
 
Table 3 Police Officers’ Salaries 
Year Investigator, Captain Detective, Major 
2010 65 768 tenge (196.43 $ ) 65 768 tenge (196.43 $) 
2013 117 733 tenge (351.76 $) 142 397 tenge (425.3 $) 
Source: Ministry of Justice 2011, Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2013. 
 
practiced by corrupt police in Kostanay had included, in addition to extorting cash and drugs, 
different types of maintenance services ranging from offering protection of drug dealers from 
both other criminals and the public to directly recruiting the new drug distributors. 
 
Activity 1. Obtaining Cash from Drug Dealers 
It was clearly stated during the trial in Kostanay that higher members of drug distributing 
network provided large amounts of cash to police. As Ms. Chebunina, one of the drug lords, 
testified in court, she had supervised packaging of heroin, the process that took place in the 
apartments rented for 2 or 3 days. In this manner this practice was nearly institutionalized.  
“It was impossible to sell from the house, during a day nearly 60 police officers were 
coming to her, the amount of drug addicts was less. We needed to change 
apartments, because they were not giving us to sell. These police officers used to 
find us and then burst into flats demanding more money. Sometimes, we were 
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renting apartment just for one night. The need to cover our activities was clear, no 
payments can guarantee completely the safety of drug dealers. So, even when the 
bribes were given we preferred to hide” (Criminal case number 1-1/2014).  
She paid for her safety, she knew exactly what she was doing. Police officers sometimes 
called her requesting extra cash. She could not refuse. Sometimes other leading members of 
this criminal gang were transferring money to police officers through her (Criminal case 
number 1-1/2014).  
Low-ranking police officers did not have any specified payment rate. On average, 
they were taking between 2,000 and 4,000 tenge for everyday expenses on lunches and 
gasoline (na hod nog, as they called it). If the payments were made on time, then police did 
not capture the street-level drug distributors (runners) and did not interfere into their trade. 
However, when it came to high-ranking officers, cash amounts were much higher. The 
notebook seized from one drug packing woman specified these amounts on the monthly basis 
(Criminal case number 1-1/2014). Rezida, the drug lord, told her that Dima Koreets wanted 
to meet her and that she should pay 40,000 tenge at this meeting. However, she brought only 
20 000 tenge to this meeting because her drug trade turnover was less than Rezida’s. After 
this meeting, she was obliged to pay the police officer 10,000 tenge every week (Criminal 
case number 1-1/2014).  
Another police officer Mr. Almagambetov was asking cash from drug lords for many 
purposes. In fact, they were collecting money for weddings of their bosses, for various 
presents, even for the job certification (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). In some cases, drug 
lords complained to police chiefs that their subordinates extort too much cash. Ms. 
Seredenkova, one of the drug lords, had been blaming one police officer, who wanted 
introduce himself to her in order to extort cash. She told Almagambetov that this police 
officer had demanded 10,000 tenge from her in exchange for returning mobile phones and 
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drugs, which he had earlier taken from her runners. She had insisted that Almagambetov 
showed him his place. She threatened Almagambetov that she would complain to his boss in 
order to pressure this police officer. This threat worked. A few hours later Almagambetov 
called her back and told her that he had informed his boss about this police officer. The boss 
promised to punish this police officer (Criminal case number 1-1/2014).  
In some cases, drug dealers threatened to contact police bosses when police from 
other police stations extorted too much. On June 25, 2012, drug lord Chebunina received a 
phone call from an unknown police officer who told her that he had captured her runners. 
After his phone call, she had immediately contacted Almagambetov for help. He had 
suggested that it might be a police officer from another police station and promised to find 
him. Then, Almagambetov called her that this police officer would release her runners in 
exchange for an insignificant amount of money and recommended to contact one of his 
bosses nicknamed “Mamul’ka” about this incident. Chebunina replied that it was 
inappropriate manner to ask for help, and that she would contact his boss if this police officer 
comes back. She gave him not more than 4,000 tenge after these phone conversations 
(Criminal case number 1-1/2014).  
Finally, some police officers asked for cash not for themselves but for gasoline and/or 
heroin for drug users working for them (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). Paradoxically, 
collusion with drug dealers helped police officers to fake criminal statistics, which showed 
impressive results shown in the Table 1 above. 
In short, these cash flows from drug packagers and dealers were a continuous and 
significant source of revenue for low-ranking police officers and their superiors, even though 
it took place in the complicated web of negotiations, trust and distrust, threats and 
compromises, and hierarchical relationships within and across drug distribution networks and 
police force. 
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Activity 2. Recruiting Street-Level Drug Sellers  
It is difficult to estimate how many runners to sell drugs on the streets police actually 
recruited in Kostanay. Police officers surely knew numerous drug users among whom they 
could select the runners. As Mr. Nevezhin, one of the street-level drug sellers, testified in the 
Kostanay trial:  
“I began using heroin in 1996. In 2010, I was detained by police officers for 
the purchase of heroin. We had settled all with them immediately in order not to 
initiate criminal proceedings. So that I had not been imprisoned. There was Serik, I 
don’t know his surname. I did know that he worked in the Anti-Drug City Police 
Department. Serik offered me to work for Rezida Asylbaeva, to help her. I agreed. In 
2011, approximately, in September or October, I was brought to Asylbaeva for a 
conversation. They had introduced me, I said that I will be ‘runner’. My work 
included distribution of heroin, since then, I began to work for Asylbaeva Rezida” 
(Criminal case number 1-1/2014, 97). 
 
Activity 3. Protecting to Street Drug Sellers from Other Police Officers 
Having helped recruiting the runners, police also provided protection to them. One runner, 
Mr. Boronchuk, testified in court that he had met police officers at the time when he worked 
for the drug lord Asylbaeva. He had to know them in person. They helped him as soon as he 
used to leave the rented apartment.  For this purpose, they drove their car as his security 
guards. Even drug users always laughed, saying, “...you ride with a guard constantly.” They 
did not pursue him, but created a “green corridor,” in order to allow him to move quietly, 
without incidents in the city (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). When he was arrested by 
patrol police, he called Rezida. She had immediately called someone in the police. While he 
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was talking to patrol police staff in order to buy time, they put him in their patrol car and 
have taken heroin and money away from him. Very soon, another police car arrived. Police 
officers came out of this car and negotiated with the agreed with the Patrol police, returned 
him seized heroin, and took him with them (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). He also gave to 
police officers information on the drug users. Police officers were paid from drug sales, so 
that they did not detain drug users who wanted buy from him heroin (Criminal case number 
1-1/2014). 
According to this runner, “I was captured by four police officers in August 2012 
while selling heroin. My partner had left immediately. However, they wanted to catch him 
as well. They began asking me where he was. I told them that I didn’t know. Then, they 
told me that they will throw on more heroin into my pocket, if won’t cooperate with them. 
I was detained for nearly half an hour. After that time Rezida came with their chief. They 
had a conversation and I was left easily” (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). Another 
runner, Mr. Zizhko, also testified in court, that on July 1, 2012, he had been detained by 
the beat cop. Zizhko managed to call police officer Almagambetov, who quickly arrived to 
the scene, took this beat cop aside and negotiated Zizhko’s release.  
However, despite the perception that drug dealers were capable to serve a whole law 
enforcement system for their purposes, there were situations when the contact with honest 
police officers lead to significant difficulties for them. These difficulties were solved by their 
friend in the police uniform. The example of troubled cooperation was found in the testimony 
of one runner, Mr. Shefer. On July 8, 2012, he was stopped by patrol police service (Criminal 
case number 1-1/2014). Being assured by Gizazulin, a corrupted police officer, that nothing 
would happen to him, Shefer decided not to run from them. Patrol police searched Shefer and 
seized 6 small doses of heroin with him. They immediately began preparing the criminal case 
file to continue the prosecution procedures. Even through Gizazulin tried to negotiate the 
problem with investigator, he had sent Shefer to the police station in order to open the 
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criminal case (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). Then, Gizazulin had changed his tactics and 
took Shefer and the heroin into his car. While driving to the police station Gizazulin himself 
had substituted heroin with disintegrated candies. This process had assured that the forensic 
examination will fail to find illicit narcotic substance in Shefer’s packages. Also, on the way 
to police station, Gizazulin instructed Shefer to tell the investigation that he had found these 
packages and was going to bring them voluntarily to police (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). 
Having arrived at the police station, Gizazulin gave these packages to the investigator. A few 
minutes later Shefer was interrogated and released. Gizazulin asked Shefer for 10,000 tenge 
to give to the investigator in return for documenting that the heroin was not sold, but instead 
that it was voluntary brought to the police station (Criminal case number 1-1/2014).  
Finally, another drug lord testified that police officer Almagambetov had 
recommended her to expand her drug trade to a neighboring small city. He told her “I 
coordinate drug issues there, nothing will happen to you. Don’t be afraid” (Criminal case 
number 1-1/2014).  
 
Activity 4. Lessening the Criminal Charges 
When protection from other police officers fails, corrupt police officers protect street level 
drug sellers by lessening the charges against the latter. As one runner testified in court, “I 
bought drugs from the Nevezhina’s runner from 2 to 10 doses. Then police officers have 
found 9 “halves" of heroin. I would have received nearly 15 years of imprisonment for this 
amount of drugs. However, defendant Shupov N.M. issued only 1 "half" and the remaining 8 
returned for him. So, in the end I had spent only 15 days in prison” (Criminal case number 1-
1/2014). Another runner, Gabur, testified:  
“In the end of June I went to buy heroin from Misha “Jew”. I bought nearly 10 
grams, when I was coming I was captured by police officers nearly Berezka shop. 
They had seized heroin from me, despite the fact that there were no witnesses to the 
73 
 
search. They had put me into their car, began blackmailing, threatening and 
intimidating me. Then they had offered me to cooperate with them and work for a 
woman called Polina (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). If I were to disagree they 
would launch criminal prosecution against me. In case money or drugs will be lost, 
they told me that they will find me. Also, they had assured me that if I will go 
somewhere to inform higher authorities about their actions, then I should feel 
nervous for my future. Not surprisingly, I had agreed. Later on, they took my phone 
number and told me that I won’t be penalized for heroin distribution, since they 
would assure my safety issues. Afterwards, I was captured by other police officers 
several times. However, those police officers who had protected me were always on 
time. For example, once I was captured by police patrol. That time amount of police 
officers was massive, even SWAT was there. I had called guys as we agreed before.  
They came in 10-15 minutes on the official car with government license 
plates…They went directly to senior officers, they stand aside from others and 
negotiations begun. Then Almagambetov took money and heroin from the car, came 
to us and told: Everything is fine, the operational group is coming, they would take 
care of everything. In fact, this group came very soon and had written fake report 
that we had nothing, no heroin and no money with us. …Almagambetov put us into 
his car, recovered money and heroin, except 15 000 tenge, which he had given to the 
senior officers, as he said. They actually helped us very often we could call them 
whenever in need, they talked to other police officers by phone and then we were 
free to go” (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). 
 
Activity 5. Protecting Street-Level Drug Sellers from Drug Addicts 
As one runner testified in court, a police officer named Samat helped him when the former 
had a problem with drug addicts in early August 2012. One addict attacked him in the area of 
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“green” bazaar in order to take heroin from him and extra money from him on a regular basis 
(otmechatsya). He complained to Samat. And at the next time when this drug addict called 
him, he told Samat where he was. Samat arrived quickly, took this man and talked to him. 
After that no drug addicts disturbed his drug sale. In return, this runner paid Samat around 
5,000 tenge and gave 3 or 4 heroin doses, as was specified by the drug lord Polina. Also, this 
runner passed heroin to Samat 4 or 5 times through a drug addict named Alexander (Criminal 
case number 1-1/2014). 
 
Activity 7. Protecting Drug Dealers from the General Public in the Neighborhood 
Kostanay anti-drug department also tried to calm down the population suspecting that the 
illicit drug trade in their neighborhood. As the runner Zhizhko testified: “Once they were 
trying to release us from the Patrol Police, as usual they needed to call higher authorities. So, 
the negotiation was intense. Once the problem was solved and patrol officers had left them, 
an ordinary man dressed in a simple manner appeared and became demanding from Sidorov 
to search us. “I saw those selling drugs. I had observed that staying on my balcony!” As a 
result his supervisor came and took us into the car and told him that they will clarify 
everything in the police station. After that we were delivered to our rented flat by him in 
person” (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). 
 
Activity 8. Protecting Drug Dealers from Other Criminals 
The analysis of phone conversations between criminals and police officers had proven the 
information sharing and search of so-called suspects had in fact took place. Moreover, several 
police officers were involved in the operation funded by the drug dealers. In fact, when 
runners were attacked once, drug lord Chebunina had been describing people she suspected 
to the operational police officer Yermagambetov. He assured her that his people had already 
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begun looking for them and that there would also be a check of runners just trying to steal 
money and drugs by pretending to be attacked” (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). On the 
same day, Chebunina had contacted officer Almagambetov and asked him to search for 
stolen mobile phones and possible attackers. The importance of these mobile phones had 
been stressed, since they had phone numbers of drug users. Losing these phone numbers 
would hurt the drug trade. He promised her to find them, in return he had immediately 
received drugs in exchange for having delivered several drug addicts - suspects in the 
participation of that attack (Criminal case number 1-1/2014).  
On August 3, 2012, unknown persons robbed two runners: nearly 100,000 tenge and 
drugs were taken from them, and their car was severely damaged. Drug lord Asylbayeva had 
immediately contacted officers Almagambetov and Junusov. Almagambetov visited her on 
the same day and brought 26,000 tenge. He told her that they had found attackers with 30,000 
tenge but no heroin. In return, she gave him 10,000 tenge. During this conversation, they had 
decided that they would need to recruit a new runner (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). Few 
days later, he brought to her a young sportsman willing to work with them as a security 
guard. Then, the drug dealing ring begun operate in a normal manner. As the court specified, 
none of the runners had officially came to the police with the statement, so police officers 
begun search on their own. This fact was very important for prosecution to prove the 
presence of corrupt actions taken by police officers. 
 
Activity 9. Regular Monitoring the Drug Trade  
Acting as supervisors in an average corporation, police higher-ups regularly checked and 
evaluated the conduct of the heroin trade, including security of street drug sellers, in 
Kostanay. According to the court records, on July 1, 2012, officer Almagambetov phoned 
drug lord Chebunina and asked whether everything was fine, how the business was going, 
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and whether anyone threatened her drug dealers. At the end of conversation, he thanked her 
for helping him with drugs delivery on the previous day (Criminal case number 1-1/2014). 
Monitoring drug trade also took a form of consultation. Corrupt police chiefs contacted drug 
dealers with recommendations on when to change mobile phone numbers, not to sell drugs in 
certain places, and so on.  
To conclude, police corruption in Kostanay ranged from extorting cash and narcotics 
to recruiting drug dealers to protecting illegal drug trade to opening new drug marketplaces. 
These functions were clearly based on the routine exchange of cash, drugs, threats and favors 
among police chiefs and drug leaders and runners. Once up and running, this illegal trade 
produced a mutual dependence among corrupt police and drug dealers, as both sides 
benefitted from growing sales of heroin. 
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Conclusion 
 
Kazakhstani police has been involved in the growing illicit drug trade with significant 
amount of drugs and money exchanged between members of criminal community and police 
brotherhood for a long period of time. As I have shown, several types of incentives had 
conditioned this illegal business relationship in Kostanay. The structure of law enforcement 
as a system of vertical internal incentives in Kazakhstan had, in fact, encouraged some police 
officers to participate in illegal drug trade, which, in turn, allowed them to accumulate 
significant amount of financial and political power. In this system, individual police officers 
are strongly encouraged to make choices beneficial for the superiors and to display loyalty to 
the higher-ups, and those who dare to challenge their chiefs might be swiftly punished. The 
Kostanay drug mafia prosecutions punished only low level and mid-level police officers, 
while senior officers had escaped criminal responsibility. Moreover, Soviet legacy of closed 
bureaucratic policing with its own statistical evaluation discourages detection and 
prosecution of the large-scale drug trafficking. Acting on these internal incentives, as I have 
shown in the preceding chapter, police officers engaged in routine predatory policing and 
daily business interactions with drug dealers. These police officers felt protected by their 
superiors and attracted by the possibility of quick enrichment through illegal drug dealing, a 
strong external horizontal incentive provided by the drug dealers. However, other external 
horizontal factors such as rivalry with the Committee of National Security and the General 
Procuracy, public exposure by the mass media, and shaming by non-governmental 
organizations, have sometimes been capable of challenging the existing system of police 
collusion with drug dealers. All this shows that police reform must change the system of 
internal and external incentives in the law enforcement agencies in order to get rid of police 
corruption and to tackle the large-scale drug-trafficking. Currently, prosecution of corrupt 
police officers only worsens the situation by victimizing the ‘pawns’ in the system, who had 
been forced to participate in the illicit activities, while being toothless in both counteracting 
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corruption in the higher rungs of the law-enforcement system and punishing large-scale drug-
trafficking.  
My thesis helps improve our understanding of political institutions’ operation in states 
transitioning from authoritarian legacy of the Soviet Union. My deep examination of these 
highly resonant court proceedings against law enforcement agents shows us why and how 
police interacts with drug dealers the way it does, and why and how the police anti-corruption 
campaign is implemented in Kazakhstan. Despite the fact that scholars (Hale 2005; Olcott 
2010) characterize Kazakhstan as authoritarian political regime, in which law enforcement 
agencies are granted wider opportunities to abuse the system in return for their non-
negotiable obligation to maintain existing regime, successful prosecution of corrupt police 
officers does take place (Engvall 2011). Addressing this empirical problem helps observe 
motivations of corrupted and non-corrupted political actors participating in the fight against 
international illicit drug trade and anti-corruption campaign. Learning seriously about illicit 
police behavior, selective enforcement of law, falsification of criminal statistics, informal 
money extortion among police officers themselves and elite’s influence in the sphere of illicit 
drug trade addresses the gap in the studies of post-soviet formal institutions (criminal law, 
criminal procedure, and statistical indicators of police performance) and informal practices 
(Soviet legacies, business relationships between police and drug dealers, and Esprit de 
Corps). This sharpens our understanding of post-soviet elite struggles and strategies various 
elite members use to accumulate more power and organize power coalitions. Moreover, my 
thesis sheds the light on the activities and strategies of organized crime groups flourishing in 
authoritarian regimes. More precisely, it contributes to comparative criminology by offering a 
precise explanation of why capabilities and nature of organized crime are more powerful than 
the law-enforcement agenda of the government of Kazakhstan. Finally, it contributes to 
comparative criminal justice system as a result of explanation how interaction of corruption, 
Esprit de Corps and inter departmental rivalries and cooperation in these departments shape 
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the quality of law enforcement performance on the regional, national and international levels. 
In other words, allows us to see how exactly the interplay between formal institutions and 
informal practices weakens the ability of Kazakhstan fulfill its international obligations in 
combating transnational drug trafficking. 
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